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ABSTRACT
Despite a recognized need for whistleblowing systems in academic research, little 
to no attention has been given to the necessary requirements for and specific design of 
effective whistleblowing systems. In order to increase the rate of reporting, it is critical 
for reporting systems to be designed with the intent to reduce employee fears and 
inhibitions by reducing the potential for retaliation. Therefore, the goal of this three-essay 
dissertation was to enhance a firm’s ability to solicit and investigate concerns by 
proposing and evaluating a system aimed at fostering anonymous, two-way 
communication between employees and investigators of wrongdoing.
In essay one, design science (Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995; Walls, 
Widmeyer, & El Sawy, 1992, 2004) was employed in order to theorize and justify the 
design of an anonymous reporting system artifact. In doing so, existing reporting systems 
were examined and modem technologies were incorporated into a proposed design of an 
anonymous, two-way ethics management reporting system.
Essay two reviewed existing theories in the extant whistleblowing literature and 
relied upon communication research, both inter-personal and computer-mediated, to 
address the limitations of prior theory regarding reduced perceptions of credibility for 
anonymous whistleblowers. The experiment tasked subjects with evaluating simulated 
two-way communication between an investigator and an employee attempting to blow 
the whistle on financial wrongdoing. The results provide strong evidence that two-way
communication can reduce the credibility gap between perceptions of anonymous and 
identified whistleblowers.
Lastly, essay three assessed the system design proposed in essay one from the 
perspective of the organizational insider. The proposed system was also compared to 
other channels available to report wrongdoing, such as the use of open door policies and 
telephone hotlines. Two simultaneous online experiments tested user perceptions of 
anonymity protections provided by each channel, as well as the specific whistleblower- 
oriented design features proposed in the design. This essay provides evidence that online 
reporting systems are perceived to provide significantly higher anonymity protections 
than phone hotlines and open door policies, while select features of the proposed system 
impact user perceptions of anonymity.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“Man is least himself when he talks in his own person.
Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth.”
-  Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist (1891)
The need for greater organizational self-governance has received increased 
attention in recent years due to a number of major corporate scandals in the United States, 
such as those which resulted in the demise of Enron, Worldcom and Tyco. While high 
profile cases of misconduct are well known, a wide variety of undesirable business 
practices and employee behaviors also plague the business world. It is estimated that over 
one third of employees have observed misconduct within their organization (Rothschild 
& Miethe, 1999), yet only one quarter of those who observe wrongdoing will report it 
(Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004). Despite the low incidence of reporting, the 
fact that employees were responsible for uncovering 17% of the alleged corporate frauds 
involving U.S. companies with more than 750 million U.S. dollars in assets between 
1996 and 2004 shows that employee reporting can be highly effective at detecting 
wrongdoing within organizations (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010). Thus, it is clear that 
those within the organization are well suited to serve as a first line of defense for
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organizations in detecting and reporting wrongdoing in the form of behavior termed 
whistleblowing (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008b; Miceli & Near, 
2005). Therefore, organizations should ensure that reports of wrongdoing are accurate 
and credible, and encourage the remaining three quarters of employees who observed 
wrongdoing but failed to report the issue, to come forward and report.
While socially desirable in its own right, firms also have self-serving strategic, 
financial and legal motivations for encouraging whistleblowing in order to prevent 
wrongdoing within their organizations (Bamberger, 2006; Callahan & Dworkin, 1992; 
Kaptein, 2010; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008; Schnatterly, 2003). The U.S. has passed a 
number of laws with provisions, such as those contained within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
which provide increased internal and external regulation and oversight in order to address 
corporate misconduct. Both pieces of legislation, among others, expand the legal 
requirements for anonymous reporting channels, provide greater employee protection 
against retaliation and increase potential monetary rewards for effective cases of 
whistleblowing (Kohn, 2011). For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has awarded as much as $14 and $30 million under the Dodd-Frank 
to individual whistleblowers for their role in uncovering wrongdoing (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2013, 2014). However, the first payment to a victim of retaliation 
was awarded to Candace King Weir in 2015, as a result of her employer’s retaliatory 
actions after discovering she had reported misconduct to the SEC (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2015). As of April 28,2015, the SEC had awarded payments to 
17 whistleblowers totaling over $50 million. Despite these cases, the legislation has been
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criticized for not outlining specific requirements to ensure compliance and essentially 
relies on the organization’s “good faith,” which might allow management to effectively 
skirt the true intent of the law and leave employees vulnerable to retaliation (Devine & 
Maassarani, 2011, pp. 84-85; Kohn, 2011, pp. 119-122).
Although whistleblowing has received considerable attention in the media and 
academic literature over the past 30 years (Bjorkelo, Bye, & Bj, 2014; Mesmer-Magnus 
& Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli & Near, 2005; Near & Miceli, 1996; Olsen, 2014; 
Vandekerckhove, Uys, Rehg, & Brown, 2014), there has been limited research focused 
on a critically overlooked component of modem whistleblowing; that is, the reporting 
system itself. Despite a recognized need for such systems in academic research (Elias, 
2008; Hassink, Vries, & Bollen, 2007; Lowry, Moody, Galletta, & Vance, 2013; MacNab 
& Worthley, 2007; C. Park & Keil, 2009; Silowash et al., 2012), little to no attention has 
been given to the necessary requirements for and specific design of effective 
whistleblowing systems. It is critical for reporting system design to (1) reduce employee 
fears and inhibitions in order to increase the rate of reporting, while also (2) assisting 
investigators in determining the credibility and accuracy of reports. Therefore, the 
primary goal of this research is to enhance a firm’s ability to solicit and investigate 
internal concerns by proposing a system design aimed at fostering anonymous, two-way 
communication between employees and investigators. Those who are responsible for 
investigating reports, such as auditors and compliance officers, will determine the 
efficacy of two-way communication for improving the assessment of anonymous report 
credibility. Further, organizational insiders’ intention to adopt and use the proposed 
system design will be compared to that of existing reporting channels already in practice.
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Literature Review
Individuals use voice in order to provide others with suggestions as well as 
concerns (Van Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003). Liang et al. (2012) proposed two specific 
types of voice: prohibitive voice and promotive voice. Prohibitive voice consists of 
“expressions of concern about work practices, incidents, or employee behavior that are 
harmful to their organization,’’ while promotive voice is the “expression of new ideas or 
suggestions for improving the overall functioning of their work unit or organization” 
(Liang et al., 2012, p. 75). Because whistleblowing is “when current or former employees 
disclose illegal, immoral, or illegitimate organizational activity to parties they believe 
may be able to stop it” (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008a) and is effective only when “the 
questionable or wrongful practice (or omission) is terminated at least partly because of 
whistleblowing and within a reasonable time frame” (Near & Miceli, 1995), employees 
wishing to blow the whistle on misconduct within their organization would do so using a 
prohibitive voice (Miceli & Near, 2013).
Organizations can also benefit from improved communication within the 
organization when employees use a promotive voice to provide other types of 
constructive feedback, whether they be opinions, concerns or ideas (Knoll & Dick, 2012; 
MacNab et al., 2007; Park & Keil, 2009; Smith & Keil, 2003; Tangirala & Ramanujam, 
2008; Van Dyne et al., 2003). Since simply speaking up (Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & 
Dutton, 1998; Miceli & Near, 1992; Withey & Cooper, 1989) using a promotive voice 
within the organization would not always meet the definition of whistleblowing, a more 
inclusive term, ethics management reporting, has been proposed in order to more 
accurately differentiate the various types of disclosure (MacNab et al., 2007).
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Ethics Management Reporting
Whistleblowing has been classified as a pro-social organizational behavior 
(Miceli & Near, 1992) and internal reporting has been viewed as a protection-motivated 
behavior (Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013), both of which employees 
can utilize to report instances of wrongdoing and misconduct observed within the 
organization. While the term whistleblowing is often widely applied to any disclosure of 
wrongdoing, it is important to distinguish the key differences among the four types of 
ethics management reporting: (1) internal reporting, (2) external reporting, (3) internal 
whistleblowing, and (4) external whistleblowing (MacNab et al., 2007). Regardless of 
whether the disclosure is made internally or externally, the primary distinction between 
reporting and whistleblowing is that reporting is conducted through organizationally 
authorized channels, whereas whistleblowing occurs when an employee does not follow 
the organization’s official reporting policy. Wrongdoing and misconduct uncovered 
through external whistleblowing, as opposed to internal reporting, can result in higher 
legal costs, more severe legal sentencing, decreased sales, and negative publicity 
(Barnett, Cochran, & Taylor, 1993). Therefore, it is critically important for organizations 
to solicit feedback from employees in order to obtain a wider view of questionable 
behavior within the organization and address concerns before they result in significant 
damage.
Internal reporting occurs when an employee utilizes an organization’s officially 
authorized channel to report wrongdoing to an empowered entity within the organization 
itself. Authorized channels are communicated to employees through an organization’s 
policies, procedures and/or training. An example of internal reporting would include the 
reporting of misconduct using an authorized internal reporting channel, such as open door
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policies, an ethics ombudsman or telephone hotline (Kaptein, 2002). While establishing 
an internal reporting channel for employees is only explicitly required for publicly traded 
firms in the U.S., it would also be wise for private firms to voluntarily implement internal 
reporting policies, procedures and systems.
External reporting is also authorized by the organization, but allows for reports to 
be received by an outside entity, such as independent auditors or third-party compliance 
firms. Although reporting to an independent entity outside of the organization may be 
perceived as more effective by employees and can allow for increased employee 
anonymity and confidentiality, external reporting can also result in a decrease in 
investigation efficiency due to an investigator’s reduced knowledge of the inner workings 
of the organization (Kaptein, 2002).
Internal whistleblowing is classified as reporting conducted within the 
organization, but via unauthorized channels. An example of internal whistleblowing 
would be when an employee does not follow an organization’s policy of first reporting 
any concerns to his or her direct supervisor and instead elects to inform higher 
management. While an organization can still maintain control over a case of internal 
whistleblowing, the rate of retaliation may increase since the employee elected to not 
follow the established reporting procedure.
External whistleblowing occurs when an employee elects to disclose misconduct 
to an outside party that the organization has not endorsed, such as the media, a 
government agency, a non-governmental organization, or a professional organization 
(Kaptein, 2010). From an organization’s perspective external whistleblowing can be a 
manager’s nightmare as it is viewed as a data breach that is likely to lead to negative
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publicity, regulatory investigations, and legal liability (Barnett et al., 1993). Rothschild & 
Miethe (1999) found that employees are more likely to resort to external whistleblowing 
“once they come to believe that internal channels are closed to them, that the organization 
is not moral, and that senior management is inert or complicit in the wrongdoing.” 
Consistent with these findings, Sims & Keenan (1998) concluded that lack of supervisor 
support, informal policies, gender, and ideal values are significantly related to external 
whistleblowing. The Ethics Resource Center (2013) reported a number of similar 
findings. For example, 45% of external whistleblowers did not trust anyone within the 
organization and 40% experienced retaliation after first reporting internally. At the same 
time, a combined 65% reported that the organization either failed to act on the internal 
report or that the whistleblower decided to report externally after becoming dissatisfied 
with the outcome. Therefore, the culture of the organization is critical to reducing the 
incidence of external whistleblowing.
While some ethicists have argued that directly confronting the alleged 
wrongdoer(s) is the only moral option initially available to an employee who wishes to 
report misconduct (Bowie, 1982; DeGeorge, 1986; Velasquez, 2005), others have 
reasoned that electing to use other channels is acceptable under certain conditions, such 
as if the employee perceives a threat of retaliation or when first attempts to solve the 
issue prove to be unsuccessful (Kaptein, 2002; Larmer, 1992; Miceli & Near, 1992). 
Therefore, while the ordering of each type of ethics management reporting is consistent 
with a logical progression from most to least desirable (i.e., from authorized to 
unauthorized and internal to external), some employees may elect to skip one or more of 
the channels due to a fear of retaliation and/or a culture of organizational silence, both of
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which will be discussed in the following sections. For the sake of simplicity, unless a 
particular type of reporting or whistleblowing is specified, any future use of the terms 
“whistleblowing” and “whistleblower” in the remainder of this proposal are to be 
interpreted in a general sense and refer to the act of disclosing wrongdoing and those who 
elect to come forward, respectively.
Employee Silence
When looking at the four types of ethics management reporting from an 
organization’s perspective, it is clear that internal reporting would be the preferred option 
(Near & Miceli, 1996; Near, 1989). This is also true for employees whose organizations 
are perceived to be supportive of employee voice in that they are more likely to raise their 
concerns internally (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Unfortunately, many organizations may 
suffer from a culture of employee silence, which has the potential to severely limit the 
incidence of internal reporting and consequently increase the likelihood of external 
whistleblowing (Barnett et al., 1993; Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989; Miceli & Near, 1985, 
1992; Near & Jensen, 1983; Near & Miceli, 1986, 1996). Morrison & Milliken (2000) 
originally proposed organizational silence in an effort to investigate the higher-level 
organizational, rather than personal, factors which might influence the reporting climate 
of an organization. Organizational silence refers to “a state in which employees refrain 
from calling attention to issues at work such as illegal or immoral practices or 
developments that violate personal, moral, or legal standards” (Knoll & van Dick, 2013). 
Knoll & Dick (2012) extended the earlier work on employee silence into a 
multidimensional construct composed of four types: 1) pro-social, 2) opportunistic,
3) acquiescent, and 4) quiescent.
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Van Dyne et al. (2003) added pro-social motives to Pinder & Harlos1 (2001) work 
on employee silence to develop the concept of pro-social silence, which is defined as 
“ withholding work-related ideas, information, or opinions with the goal of benefiting 
other people or the organization—based on altruism or cooperative motives” (Van Dyne 
et al., 2003, p. 1368). An example of pro-social silence would be the protection of 
proprietary information such as an organization’s future business strategies or the secret 
formula for a highly successful soft drink. Knoll & Dick (2012, p. 351) suggest that 
individuals may engage in pro-social silence due to “a general altruistic personality, a 
high motive for affiliation, but also interest in maintaining social capital (Adler & Kwon, 
2002) and protecting social identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989)” within the organization. 
Knoll & Dick (2012) point out that while withholding information through pro-social 
silence for the benefit of the organization is valuable, a self-interested type of employee 
silence, referred to as opportunistic silence, can also negatively impact the organization.
Opportunistic silence is defined as “strategically withholding work-related ideas, 
information, or opinions with the goal of achieving an advantage for oneself while 
accepting harm of others” (Knoll & van Dick, 2013, p. 351). An employee might engage 
in this type of silence in an attempt to gain or maintain control over a particular aspect of 
the organization.
While ethics management reporting would not be expected to have a significant 
impact on the first two types of silence, effective ethics management reporting provides 
an avenue for employees to overcome an organizational environment of suffering from 
the following two types, acquiescent and quiescent silence.
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Acquiescent silence occurs when employees eventually stop reporting 
wrongdoing after experiencing multiple failed attempts to enact change or when they feel 
that their opinion is not valued by the organization (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). This 
type of employee silence was proposed by Pinder & Harlos (2001) and occurs when 
employees are so demotivated that they passively withhold relevant ideas out of 
submission and resignation (Knoll & van Dick, 2013). Management must be aware of 
this possibility and ensure that employees perceive the internal reporting program as an 
effective tool for resolving concerns or else the organization will experience a decrease in 
the number of reports, which prevents the organization from benefiting from internal 
disclosures.
Finally, quiescent silence was introduced by Pinder & Harlos (2001) and refers to 
“the active withholding of relevant information in order to protect oneself, based on the 
fear that the consequences of speaking up could be personally unpleasant” (Knoll &
Dick, 2012, p. 351). This type of silence is consistent with Near & Miceli's (1995) theory 
that the decision to not report wrongdoing is likely driven by the fact that most 
employees are more dependent upon the organization as a source of livelihood than the 
organization depends upon them as employees. Due to this imbalance, employees who 
would otherwise report misconduct may elect to remain silent in order to avoid any 
possibility of retaliation from the organization or individuals involved.
Retaliation
With the discussion of employee silence in mind, it is easy to understand how 
employees must feel that raising concerns will be effective and without unreasonable 
personal consequences before deciding to blow the whistle (Ashford et al., 1998; Miceli
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& Near, 1992; Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Withey & Cooper, 1989). Unfortunately,
retaliation against those who speak up is quite common (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999) and
is “most likely and most severe when the observed wrongdoing is most systemic and
most central to the operation of the agency” (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999, p. 125).
Retaliation can be levied in many forms, such as: nullification, isolation, defamation,
expulsion, ostracism, demotion, or termination (Barnett et al., 1993; Dworkin & Baucus,
1998; Kaptein, 2010). Rothschild & Miethe (1999) report that approximately two thirds
of the whistleblowers in their study had experienced the following forms of retaliation:
69% lost their job or were forced to retire; 64% received negative job performance
evaluations; 68% had work more closely monitored by supervisors; 69% were criticized
or avoided by coworkers; and 64% were blacklisted from getting another job in their
field. The authors further note that the rate of retaliation due to whistleblowing was
approximately 10 to 15% higher for those who elected to report their concerns externally.
However, these effects are not limited to within the organization. Whistleblowers often
find themselves cut off from friends, family and/or outside colleagues. John Brown, as he
is referred to under a pseudonym by Alford (2001), refused to lie to the FBI to protect his
boss and described his experiences this way:
The Engineers Association, they just wished me luck, said they admired 
someone who stood up for their beliefs. Take that to the bank. They 
wouldn’t even help me find a new job. Nobody understands. Lots of 
people say they admire my spunk, but nobody has any idea of the 
consequences. No one wants to know. (Alford, 2001, p. 2)
Further, whistleblowers report alarmingly high incidences of emotional, mental 
and physical stress, such as: severe depression or anxiety (84%), feelings of isolation or 
powerlessness (84%), distrust of others (78%), declining physical health (69%), severe 
financial decline (66%), and problems with family relations (53%) (Rothschild & Miethe,
12
1999). Similar findings have been reported by the Ethics Resource Center (2013), which 
has been reproduced in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 -  Retaliation Against Whistleblowers (Ethics Resource Center, 2013)
Type of Retaliation 2011 2013
Supervisor intentionally ignored or began treating differently 69%
Other employees intentionally ignored or began treating differently 62% 59%
Supervisor or management excluded from decisions and work activity 64% 54%
Verbally abused by supervisor or someone else in management 62% 49%
Not given promotions or raises 55% 47%
Verbally abused by other employees 51% 43%
Almost lost job 56% 38%
Hours or pay were cut 46% 29%
Relocated or reassigned 44% 28%
Demoted 32% 21%
Harassed at home 29% 18%
Experienced physical harm to person or property 31% 16%
Experienced online harassment 31% 15%
Due to the severe anguish felt by a whistleblower that has experienced retaliation,
he or she may ultimately regret the decision to blow the whistle. These experiences and
resulting regret may lead employees to avoid whistleblowing in the future by remaining
acquiescent and/or quiescent silent due to the effect retaliation has had on their trust in
others, both inside and outside of the organization. This reality is commonly heard in the
statements of whistleblowers upon reflection, such as:
I keep my mouth shut these days. I’m a different person now. I don’t 
know. In hindsight I wouldn’t have said anything ... I wouldn’t have 
because it caused so much stress and it wasn’t worth it really, like 
emotionally. It was really tough going to work for so long... you’re just, 
you know, dreading going to work. (Jackson et al., 2010, p. 2198)
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If I had to do it over again, I wouldn’t blow the whistle for a million 
dollars. It ruined my life. My neighbor kept talking about all of these 
stories he’d read about “the little man who stood up against the big 
corporation and won.” Well. I stood up against the big corporation and I 
lost. I didn’t just lose my job. I lost my house, and then I lost my family. I 
don’t even see my kids anymore. My ex-father-in-law said if I’d been a 
real whistleblower I’d have been on 60 Minutes. (Alford, 2001, p. 1)
Retaliation against whistleblowers may occur for a variety of reasons. For 
example, the organization may rely upon the individual responsible for the wrongdoing, 
management may see no other alternative than to continue the wrongdoing or may simply 
believe that suppressing the disclosure will reduce or eliminate additional consequences 
(Near & Miceli, 1995). While retaliation has been shown to reduce the incidence of 
internal reporting and internal whistleblowing, actual or threatened retaliation is not an 
effective approach to silencing employees or suppressing revelations of organizational 
misconduct as the mere perception of a retaliatory climate only compounds the problem 
for the organization due to a higher likelihood of external whistleblowing (Barnett et al., 
1993; Jos et al., 1989; Miceli & Near, 1985, 1992; Near & Jensen, 1983; Near & Miceli, 
1986, 1996). Further, retaliation is more likely to result in far more damaging and public 
outcomes for the organization, such as negative publicity, regulatory investigations, and 
legal liability (Barnett et al., 1993). Therefore, rather than treat those who report 
wrongdoing as adversaries, management would be better served to view such disclosures 
as an opportunity to improve the organization (Barnett et al., 1993).
Anonymity
While the solicitation of feedback of unethical or illegal behavior from employees 
has the potential to result in corrective action, fostering an organizational culture that is 
open to the voluntary reporting of wrongdoing or misconduct is challenging due to the
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sensitive nature of reporting and the potential threat of retaliation. Therefore, 
organizations should focus on instilling measures that provide a safe environment and 
culture for reporting. Ensuring anonymity is one avenue for organizations to develop 
safer climates for whistleblowing. Anonymity is generally defined by the Merriam- 
Webster dictionary as “the quality or state of being unknown to most people.” Due to the 
threat of retaliation, whistleblowers must have assurances that their identity will not be 
revealed. The need to protect employees from retaliation is evident in the fact that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires publicly traded companies to provide anonymous 
communication channels for employees to report wrongdoing. Anonymity measures 
incorporated into policies, procedures and systems for the reporting of wrongdoing can 
address these concerns. This is due to the fact that employees perceive reporting via 
anonymous channels as less likely to result in employment loss, reputation loss, or 
harassment (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan & Schultz, 2006, 2007; Near & Miceli, 1995, 
1996) and has been shown to result in a more open and thorough exchange of ideas in 
computer-mediated communication (Jessup & Tansik, 1991). Therefore, anonymity 
measures must be in place to provide a safe channel for reporting prior to blowing the 
whistle and can protect the employee from retaliation after submitting a report.
While anonymity has been championed as a protection measure for 
whistleblowers for decades, truly achieving such anonymity is far more difficult and can 
significantly complicate the investigation process. Firstly, a system provides sender- 
anonymity if, and only if, the system prevents the receiver, or any other party, from 
identifying the sender (Sherwood, Bhattachaijee, & Srinivasan, 2005). This is extremely 
difficult to achieve in most cases since a simple process of elimination can oftentimes
identify the possible senders or recipients for a given message. Therefore, the degree of 
sender-anonymity provided by any system is dependent upon the size of the set of people 
who could have sent/received a particular message (Sherwood et al., 2005).
Secondly, regardless of a system’s ability to provide sender-anonymity, in some 
cases it might be impossible to completely disassociate the whistleblower from the 
content of his or her report and/or the context of the situation being reported (Kaptein, 
2002). For example, a salesman who reports the misconduct of a colleague that occurred 
while both were the only two employees away from the office on a business trip would 
not provide any reasonable level of anonymity protection. Therefore, it is important for 
organizations to consider authorizing external reporting to independent parties. Proper 
handling of external reporting provides greater anonymity protection for the employee in 
the event that he or she unintentionally reveals their identity. For example, the 
independent party can remove any potentially identifying information prior to informing 
the organization of the alleged wrongdoing.
Thirdly, the nature of anonymous reporting has resulted in organizations adopting 
reporting systems that prevent investigators from further communication with the 
whistleblower beyond the initial report (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Kaptein, 2002; Miceli et 
al., 2008b, p. 158). While one might consider a system that prevents an investigator from 
contacting the employee as having effective anonymity measures, the inability to obtain 
additional information from the initial report can reduce the effectiveness of the 
investigation. Investigators might need to request additional information from employees 
in order to clarify the alleged wrongdoing, obtain more evidence, or simply improve the 
efficiency of the investigation. Further, without the ability to contact the author of an
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anonymous report, investigators cannot provide status updates during the investigation or 
discuss how a particular case was resolved, which is critical to demonstrating the 
effectiveness of reporting wrongdoing. If employees perceive that their willingness to 
report wrongdoing failed to yield effective results, they may be less likely to blow the 
whistle in the future.
Lastly, researchers have suggested that the use of anonymous reporting channels 
might actually undermine the investigation process. It has been theorized that 
investigators’ might perceive anonymous reports as being less credible than those from 
identified individuals (Kaplan & Schultz, 2006, 2007; Near & Miceli, 1995, 1996), while 
potential whistleblowers’ also perceive the use of anonymous channels as less effective at 
reaching their desired outcome (Dyck et al., 2010; Miceli et al., 2008b, p. 158). Further, 
Dyck et al. (2010) found that the rate of reporting wrongdoing actually declined from 
18% to 13% following the mandatory implementation of anonymous channels required 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f2002. Therefore, despite the need for anonymity measures 
to protect whistleblowers, the use of anonymity reduces the likelihood of reporting and 
complicates the investigation process, which ultimately reduces the likelihood of 
correcting the wrongdoing. While these findings are discouraging, this dissertation 
proposes several remedies for closing the credibility gap between non-anonymous and 
anonymous reporting channels through the use of recent advancements in technology.
Management practices are also critical to the success of internal reporting 
programs and the failure to provide a safe environment for raising concerns “ foolishly 
invites catastrophe” (Callahan, Dworkin, Fort, & Schipani, 2002, p. 195) and will 
ultimately lead to employee silence and less desirable forms of ethics management
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reporting, such as external whistleblowing (Callahan et al., 2002; Jos et al., 1989; Miceli 
& Near, 1985; Near & Jensen, 1983; Near & Miceli, 1986). Employee perceptions of 
which behaviors are considered loyal are influenced by the organization’s formal and 
informal stance toward such behaviors (K. Smith & Oseth, 1993). Therefore, 
organizations should champion reporting by actively demonstrating that it is a desired 
behavior within the organization and reinforce this stance by protecting those who raise 
issues (Miceli & Near, 1994; Near & Miceli, 1996).
Research Questions 
The prior discussion of the existing literature raises the following research 
questions: (1) How can system design better protect whistleblower anonymity?', (2) How 
can system design allow for anonymous, two-way communication between the 
whistleblower and investigator?; (3) How can system design improve an investigator's 
ability to assess whistleblower credibility? (4) How can system design increase 
employees ’ likelihood o f blowing the whistle?
Research Studies
This dissertation research is comprised of three separate yet related studies on 
ethics management reporting systems: (1) The Design o f an Anonymous, Two-Way,
Ethics Management Reporting System, (2) The Impact o f  Anonymous, Two-Way 
Communication on Perceived Whistleblower Credibility, and (3) Perceptions o f  
Anonymity Protections Provided by Ethics Management Reporting Channels. The 
common thread that weaves the essays together into one cohesive dissertation is the role
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and importance of anonymity in the design and use of an ethics management reporting 
system.
CHAPTER TWO
THE DESIGN OF AN ANONYMOUS, TWO-WAY,
ETHICS MANAGEMENT REPORTING SYSTEM
Introduction
While there has been a significant number of articles in the media and academic 
literature focused on whistleblowing (Miceli & Near, 2005), limited research has focused 
on a critically overlooked component of modem whistleblowing; that is, the reporting 
system itself. Despite suggestions for, references to and a recognized need for such 
systems in academic research (Elias, 2008; Hassink et al., 2007; Lowry et al., 2013; 
MacNab & Worthley, 2007; C. Park & Keil, 2009; Silowash et al., 2012), little to no 
attention has been given to the necessary requirements for and specific design of effective 
whistleblowing systems. In order to increase the rate of reporting, it is critical for 
reporting systems to be designed with the intent to reduce employee fears and inhibitions, 
while also assisting investigators in determining the credibility and accuracy of reports. 
Therefore, the primary goal of this chapter is to enhance a firm’s ability to solicit and 
investigate concerns by proposing a modem system design aimed at fostering 
anonymous, two-way communication between employees and those responsible for 
investigating wrongdoing within organizations.
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Most of the systems currently in use for reporting wrongdoing were developed 
shortly after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which requires the 
implementation of an anonymous reporting channel for all publicly-traded firms in the 
United States. However, the progression of system development appears to be quite 
limited since. In fact, most of the recent development has been driven by media 
organizations, such as the Freedom of the Press Foundation (https://ffeedom.press/). For 
example, platforms such as WikiLeaks, SecureDrop and GlobaLeaks primarily cater to 
and encourage the public release of information through various news outlets. Further, 
SecureDrop and GlobaLeaks are open source projects, which allows for a wide adoption 
among media organizations.
Research has shown that those who disclose wrongdoing are likely to experience 
high rates of retaliation. Due to the increase in external channels for reporting 
wrongdoing, it is critical that firms respond by providing employees with effective and 
safe channels to internally report issues and concerns in order to reduce the risk of 
potentially damaging information being released publicly. Therefore, firms must ensure 
that internal channels provide high degrees of anonymity, otherwise organizations risk 
employees seeking external channels capable of granting better anonymity protection.
Despite its use in practice, prior research has yet to even suggest the possibility of 
two-way communication in the context of whistleblowing. Two-way communication is 
capable of improving the exchange of information between source and investigator, 
which allows for follow up questions to be asked by the investigator that could lead to 
additional information to be provided by the whistleblower. Further, two-way 
communication allows the whistleblower to remain informed of the status of their claim
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and any subsequent investigation. Although existing systems have adopted two-way 
communication capabilities, they fail to provide adequate anonymity protections. In 
addition, affording whistleblowers with anonymity increases the challenge of 
investigating claims. Therefore, additional methods and metrics must be incorporated into 
the design of reporting systems in order to assist investigators in assessing whistleblower 
credibility.
Despite a steady stream of whistleblowing research over the past 25 years, both 
literature and practice have yet to benefit from a formal design for an effective 
anonymous whistleblowing system. In order to meet this need, this chapter proposes the 
necessary requirements for and a conceptual design of such a system. In doing so, this 
chapter will employ design science (Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995; Walls, 
Widmeyer, & El Sawy, 1992, 2004) to theorize and justify the design of an anonymous 
reporting system artifact by building constructs, developing models and explaining the 
methods necessary to achieve the desired goals of reporting for all actors involved.
Literature Review
This section will provide a review of the relevant literature for the design of an 
ethics management reporting system. First, design science will be introduced and 
explained in order to provide an outline of the design process. Second, ethics 
management reporting, along with its four subclasses, will be explained in order to 
distinguish the differences among various types of disclosure. Finally, theories and 
methods supporting the use of two-way, anonymous communication will be examined in 




Design science, as opposed to natural science, focuses on the creation of artifacts 
to attain desired outcomes to problems (Simon, 1988; Walls et al., 2004). A number of 
articles have established a solid foundation for design science research process. 
Specifically, March & Smith (1995) organized design science research into activities and 
outputs, while Hevner et al. (2004) outlined a number of guidelines for conducting design 
science research, and Walls et al. (1992, 2004) stressed the need for design science to be 
grounded in theory. As such, this section will provide an overview of design science by 
reviewing these seminal works.
Activities and outputs. The development of artifacts to accomplish specific tasks 
is rooted in design science. However, in order to effectively employ design science, one 
must first understand the necessary activities and desired outputs of such pursuits. March 
& Smith (1995) developed a research framework which outlines a number of activities 
and outputs of design science research. The activities in which one would engage while 
conducting design science research draw from design science and natural science and 
consist of: (1) build, (2) evaluate, (3) theorize, and (4) justify. Building and evaluating are 
the primary activities of design science while theorizing and justifying are at the core of 
natural science. The combination of both natural science and design science research 
perspectives allows for the creation of new artifacts based upon grounded theory in order 
to solve relevant issues.
The outputs of conducting design science research consist of: (1) constructs,
(2) models, (3) methods, and (4) instantiations. Constructs are developed in order to 
provide the vocabulary to be used for a given domain. Therefore, constructs allow
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designers to form a conceptualization of the problems within the domain so that potential 
solutions can be specified. Models express the relationships among constructs through a 
set of propositions or statements among constructs. The use of models allows designers to 
represent the situations under examination as problem and solution statements. Each of 
the activities is briefly described in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 -  Activities of Design Science Research (March & Smith, 1995)
Item Description
The construction o f  the artifact, demonstrating that such an artifact can be 
constructed. We build constructs, models, methods, and instantiations.
The development o f criteria and the assessment o f artifact performance against 
those criteria. We evaluate artifacts to determine if we have made any progress.
The construction o f theories that explain how or why something happens. 
Determines why and how the artifact worked or did not work.











Before designers can begin the design process, it is critical to outline the process 
to be used to achieve the goals of the system. Therefore, methods are outlined in order to 
provide the steps to be used. Methods are based on the set of underlying constructs and 
models, which provides a full representation of the solution space. Lastly, after relying 
upon the constructs, models and methods, designers should ultimately reach a full 
instantiation of the artifact. In sum, design science is focused on building and evaluating 
artifacts to achieve desired outcomes, while also theorizing and justifying the design and 
outcomes of such artifacts. Each of the outputs is briefly described in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 -  Outputs of Design Science Research (March & Smith, 1995)
Item Description
2
Constructs Form the vocabulary o f a domain. Constitute a conceptualization used to describe problems within the domain and to specify their solutions.
G--w
Models Set of propositions or statements expressing relationships among constructs.o Represent situations as problem and solution statements.
J Swi_ Methods Set o f steps used to perform a task. Based on a set o f underlying constructs and
V
«e a representation (model) o f the solution space.
06
Instantiations The realization of an artifact in its environment. Operationalizes constructs,models, and methods.
Research guidelines. In order to further advance the use of design science, 
Hevner, March, Park, & Ram (2004) developed a set of guidelines for conducting design 
science research. The guidelines consist of: (1) design as an artifact, (2) problem 
relevance, (3) design evaluation, (4) research contributions, (5) research rigor,
(6) design as a search process, and (7) communication o f research. Each of the 
guidelines is briefly described in Table 2.3. Hevner et al. (2004) also extended prior 
design science frameworks by illustrating how the suggested research guidelines for 
conducting design science and the activities and outputs outlined in March & Smith
(1995) work in unison to leverage the collective knowledge base in order to solve 
relevant problems in the business environment. The relationships among the various 
aspects of design science are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Table 2.3 -  Design Science Research Guidelines (Hevner et al., 2004)
Guideline Description
Design as an Design-science research must produce a viable artifact in the form o f a construct,
Artifact a model, a method, or an instantiation.
Problem  The objective o f design-science research is to develop technology-based solutions
Relevance to important and relevant business problems.
Design Evaluation
The utility, quality, and efficacy o f a design artifact must be rigorously 




Effective design-science research must provide clear and verifiable contributions 
in the areas of the design artifact, design foundations, and/or design 
methodologies.
Design-science research relies upon the application o f rigorous methods in both 
the construction and evaluation o f the design artifact.
Design as a 
Search Process
The search for an effective artifact requires utilizing available means to reach 
desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem environment.
Communication 
of Research
Design-science research must be presented effectively both to technology- 


















































Application in the Additions to the
Appropriate Environment Knowledge Base
Figure 2.1 -  Information Systems Research Framework (Hevner et al., 2004)
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Design theory. Walls et al. (1992,2004) outlined components for information 
system design theories (ISDT), which views design as both a product and a process. The 
necessary theory components for a design product consist of the following: (1) meta­
requirements, (2) meta-design, (3) kernel theories, and (4) testable design product 
hypotheses. The necessary theory components for the design process consist of:
(1) design method, (2) kernel theories, and (3) testable design process hypotheses. The 
components of information system design theory are briefly described in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 -  Information System Design Theory (Walls et al., 1992, 2004)
Component Description
Meta-requirements Describes the class of goals to which the theory applies.
o3T3Ou




Kernel theories Theories from natural or social sciences governing design requirements.
O Testable design 
product hypotheses
Used to test whether the meta-design hypotheses satisfies the meta­
requirements.









Theories from natural or social sciences governing design process 
itself.
Used to verity whether the design hypotheses method results in an 
artifact which is consistent with the meta-design.
The components of an ISDT are embedded within the information system design 
process. The kernel theories provide the theoretical foundation for meeting the meta­
requirements for a particular system. Each component then lays the foundation for meta­
design and the design method. Once the artifact has been designed, the product and 
process must both be assessed using testable hypotheses. The relationships and 
dependencies among ISDT components are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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| Kernel Theories | | Kernel Theories 1
I
I Meta-design | | Design Method |I |
| Testable design product hypotheses | | Testable design process hypotheses |
Figure 2.2 -  Relationships Among ISDT Components (Walls et al., 1992,2004)
For the purposes of this design science research, the following design theory 
components have been identified and outlined for inclusion in the design product and 
design process for the development of an anonymous, two-way ethics management 
system (Table 2.5). The meta-requirements for such a system should (1) provide high 
level whistleblower anonymity, (2) increase the incidence of disclosing wrongdoing, and
(3) enhance the accuracy of investigator assessment. In order to meet these requirements, 
the meta-design will employ a variety of technological components from computer 
science, such as anonymity measures, data encryption and text-analysis.
Kernel theories will be pulled from reference disciplines, such as communication, 
management and ethics, in order to establish mental models of the perceived threats and 
system use cases, as well as assess the effectiveness of the design process. Ultimately, the 
design product and design process will be assessed by testing formal hypotheses, such as: 
investigators will more accurately assess whistleblower credibility through two-way 
communication; users will perceive the proposed system features as providing high 
degrees of anonymity. However, as the present chapter is only focused on the theoretical
28
and conceptual system design, these formal tests will be conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this dissertation.
Table 2.5 -  Design Theory for Anonymous, Two-Way Ethics Management Systems
Component C riteria
Meta-requirements
System should provide high level whistleblower anonymity, increase 
the incidence o f disclosing wrongdoing, and enhance the accuracy of
9T3 investigator assessment
L.eu Meta-design Anonymity measures, Encryption, Text-analysis
JStP*55 Kernel theories Computer science, Communication, Management and Ethics
Q Testable design product Users will perceive the system to provide high level anonymity;
hypotheses investigators will more accurately assess whistleblower credibility
Existing systems and emerging technology will be assessed and
C* Design method considered for inclusion into the design o f ethics management
20-
systems
cw> Kernel theories Communication, management and ethics theories
»>
Q Testable design process The assessment o f  the system by potential whistleblowers will
hypotheses provide testable hypotheses for the design
Ethics Management
Before initiating the design process, it is essential that key concepts and terms are 
clearly established. While the term whistleblowing is often widely applied to any 
disclosure of wrongdoing, it is important to distinguish the key differences among four 
types of disclosures, or ethics management reporting (Table 2.6): (1) internal reporting,
(2) external reporting, (3) internal whistleblowing, and (4) external whistleblowing 
(MacNab et al., 2007). Regardless of whether the disclosure is made internally or 
externally, the primary distinction between reporting and whistleblowing is that reporting 
is conducted through organizationally authorized channels, whereas whistleblowing 
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While some ethicists have argued that directly confronting the alleged 
wrongdoer(s) is the only moral option initially available to an employee who wishes to 
correct misconduct (Bowie, 1982; DeGeorge, 1986; Velasquez, 2005), others have 
reasoned that electing to use other channels is acceptable under certain conditions, such 
as if the employee perceives a threat of retaliation or when first attempts to solve the 
issue prove to be unsuccessful (Kaptein, 2002; Larmer, 1992; Miceli & Near, 1992). 
Therefore, while the ordering of each type of ethics management reporting is consistent 
with a logical progression from most to least desirable (i.e., from authorized to 
unauthorized and internal to external), some employees may elect to skip one or more of 
the channels due to a fear of retaliation and/or a culture of organizational silence, both of 
which will be discussed later in greater detail.
Internal reporting. Internal reporting occurs when an employee utilizes an 
organization’s officially authorized channel to report wrongdoing to an empowered entity 
within the organization itself. Authorized channels are communicated to employees 
through an organization’s policies, procedures and/or training. An example of internal 
reporting would include the reporting of misconduct using an authorized internal 
reporting channel, such as open door policies, an ethics ombudsman or telephone hotline 
(Kaptein, 2002). While establishing an internal reporting channel for employees is only 
explicitly required for publicly traded firms in the United States, private firms would be 
wise to voluntarily implement internal reporting policies, procedures and systems.
External reporting. External reporting is also authorized by the organization, but 
allows for reports to be received by an outside entity, such as independent auditors or 
third-party compliance firms. Although reporting to an independent entity outside of the
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organization may be perceived as more credible by employees and can allow for 
increased employee anonymity and confidentiality, external reporting can also result in a 
decrease in investigation efficiency due to a the investigator’s reduced knowledge of the 
inner workings of the organization (Kaptein, 2002). An excellent example of 
organizationally-approved external reporting would be the sharing of actionable 
information as it pertains to threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents with an industry’s 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC).
Internal whistleblowing. Internal whistleblowing is classified as reporting 
conducted within the organization, but via unauthorized channels. An example of internal 
whistleblowing would be when an employee does not follow an organization’s policy of 
first reporting any concerns to his or her direct supervisor and instead elects to inform 
higher management. While an organization can still maintain control over a case of 
internal whistleblowing, the likelihood of retaliation may increase since the employee 
elected to not follow the established reporting procedure.
External whistleblowing. External whistleblowing occurs when an employee 
elects to disclose misconduct to an outside party that the organization has not endorsed, 
such as the media, a government agency, a non-governmental organization, or a 
professional organization (Kaptein, 2010). From an organization’s perspective external 
whistleblowing can be a manager’s nightmare as it is viewed as a breach that is likely to 
lead to negative publicity, regulatory investigations, and legal liability (Barnett et al., 
1993). Rothschild & Miethe (1999) found that employees are more likely to resort to 
external whistleblowing “once they come to believe that internal channels are closed to 
them, that the organization is not moral, and that senior management is inert or complicit
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in the wrongdoing.” Consistent with these findings, Sims & Keenan (1998) concluded 
that supervisor support, informal policies, gender, and ideal values are significantly 
related to external whistleblowing. Therefore, the culture of the organization is critical to 
reducing the incidence o f external whistleblowing.
For the sake of simplicity, unless a particular type of reporting or whistleblowing 
is specified, any future use of the terms “whistleblowing” or “whistleblower” in the 
remainder of this dissertation are to be interpreted in a general sense and refer to all types 
of ethics management reporting, unless a specific type is explicitly stated.
Two-Way Communication
Early models of communication (Berio, 1960; Shannon, 1948) are limited to one­
way communication due to the unidirectional nature of such transmissions. Common 
examples of one-way communication consist of radio and television, as the audience 
cannot respond to the broadcast. Thus, the inability for the receiver to communicate with 
the sender in one-way transmissions may result in a breakdown in communication as the 
sender cannot verify that the receiver properly received or understood the message.
Bamlund's (1970) addition of feedback to earlier models helps address this issue. 
This reciprocal, two-way communication method allows for a more thorough exchange of 
information as the receiver can provide feedback to the sender in order to ask for 
clarification or confirmation of the original message. An illustration of Berio's (1960) 
Sender-Message-Receiver-Channel (SMRC) Communication Model, with the inclusion 
of Bamlund's (1970) feedback, is provided in Figure 2.3. Note that Bamlund (1970) does 
not explicitly designate a sender or receiver since both parties can dynamically alternate 













Figure 2.3 -  Addition of Bamlund’s (1970) Feedback to Berio's (1960) SMRC Model
The use of feedback also allows the receiver to communicate, both verbally and 
nonverbally, with the original sender in response to his or her message. For example, 
facial expressions and body language can provide the sender with nonverbal behavioral 
cues from the receiver, which informs the sender of communication effectiveness. 
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Figure 2.4 — Bamlund's (1970) Transactional Model of Communication
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With respect to whistleblowing, two-way communication provides both 
whistleblowers and investigators the opportunity to exchange additional information 
relevant to the investigation. For example, a whistleblower may neglect to, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, provide insight that is critical to the investigation. Two- 
way communication would allow for the investigator to ask the whistleblower to clarify 
information already received or request more information to aid in the investigation. 
Further, two-way communication allows for whistleblowers and investigators to develop 
a rapport, which is helpful in establishing and maintaining trust.
Anonymity. Unlinkabilitv, and Undetectabilitv! Oh. mv!
In addition to the need for two-way communication, anonymity is also critical in 
order to protect whistleblowers from retaliation. However, before discussing anonymous 
communication in general, it is useful to establish clear definitions of terms relevant to 
anonymity. A decade-long collaboration on Pfitzmann & Hansen's (2010) working paper 
provides us with a number of terms with highly refined definitions, such as: anonymity, 
unlinkability, undetectability, and unobservability. These terms and their related 
definitions are provided in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7 -  Definitions Related to Anonymity (Pfitzmann & Hansen, 2010)
Anonymity o f a subject from an attacker’s perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently identify 
the subject within a set o f subjects, the anonymity set.
Unlinkability o f two or more items o f interest (IOIs, e.g., subjects, messages, actions, ...) from an 
attacker’s perspective means that within the system (comprising these and possibly other items), the 
attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether these IOIs are related or not.
Undetectability o f an item o f  interest (IOI) from an attacker’s perspective means that the attacker cannot 
sufficiently distinguish whether it exists or not.
Unobservability o f an item o f interest (IOI) means:
•  undetectability o f the IOI against all subjects uninvolved in it; and,
•  anonymity o f the subjects) involved in the IOI even against the other subjects) involved in that IOI
Anonymity means that an interested party cannot identify an individual subject 
among the set of possible users (i.e., the anonymity set). On the other hand, identifiability 
indicates that the subject can be identified within the anonymity set and therefore no 
longer maintains any degree of anonymity from an interested party. Obviously, it is in the 
best interest of those who disclose wrongdoing to maintain anonymity when 
communicating with investigators in order to limit the likelihood of retaliation.
An item of interest, such as a user, message or action, is considered unlinkable if 
an attacker cannot connect it to another item of interest. Conversely, if an attacker can 
determine that an item of interest is related to another, the item is considered linkable. 
Unlinkability essentially provides an individual with plausible deniability with respect to 
who reported an alleged wrongdoing. However, if only a few individuals aware of the 
wrongdoing, the disclosure will be the more linkable due to the smaller anonymity set.
Undetectability refers to whether an attacker can determine whether an item of 
interest even exists. This is certainly desirable in the context of whistleblowing as an 
attacker is forced to cast a wide net and cannot target a specific user, system or 
transmission.
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Unobservability requires that the item of interest be both undetectable with 
respect to those uninvolved with the transmission while also remaining anonymous to 
those who are involved. Designing a system that can achieve unobservability provides the 
greatest protection for both anonymity and security. Therefore, it is the goal of the 
proposed system to achieve unobservability.
Onion Routing
Onion routing is an anonymous communications protocol that serves as the 
fundamental concept for what is now simply known as Tor (The Onion Router). Onion 
routing was first developed in the mid-1990s by Goldschlag, Reed, & Syverson (1996), 
while all were employed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, in an effort to 
anonymize the intelligence communications of the U.S. military. The use of onion 
routing allows for low-latency communications to be relayed among multiple nodes on 
the Internet prior to reaching the intended destination, which prevents the destination 
from knowing the IP address of the sending device. This is achieved by wrapping the 
transmission data in multiple layers of encryption, with each layer of the proverbial onion 
peeled off in succession by each of the intended relays comprising the onion routing 
circuit. Each layer of encryption only contains the IP address for the next node in the 
circuit so that no single node has knowledge of anything beyond who sent the packet and 
where it should be forwarded. As long as the circuit is comprised of at least three nodes, 
no single node can determine the full path of the circuit. Goldschlag, Reed, & Syverson's
(1996) conceptualization of onion routing is reproduced in Figure 2.5.
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Secure Site In terne t
W is a Proxy/Routing Node 
controlled by Secure Site





Data Flow (with Function/Key Pairs if crypted)
Unsecured Socket Connection
Virtual Circuit through Link Encrypted Connection Between Routing Nodes 
Link Encrypted Connection Between Routing Nodes
Routing Node
Routing/Proxy Node
Figure 2.5 -  Onion Routing (Goldschlag, Reed, & Syverson, 1996)
Existing Reporting Channels
A number of channels have been used to solicit reports of wrongdoing, with 
postal mail being the most rudimentary and telephone hotlines being the most common 
(Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999). However, the advent of the Internet has allowed for 
the use of other channels, such as web forms and e-mail. This section will outline the 
benefits and limitations of each in greater detail.
Open door policy. The intent of an open door policy is to encourage employees to 
speak to members of management rather than withhold information by remaining silent.
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However, the extant research in this area shows how such policies might not produce the 
desired results if organizational culture does not match what is said in the employee 
handbook. As one might expect, employees are naturally hesitant to share negative news 
or opinions with management (Detert & Burris, 2007; Detert & Trevino, 2010; Miceli & 
Near, 1994; Morrison & Milliken, 2000), especially if it might reflect poorly on their 
standing within the organization (C. Park & Keil, 2009; Rosen & Tesser, 1970; H. J. 
Smith & Keil, 2003; Wang, Keil, & Wang, 2015). Most importantly, it is impossible to 
disclose wrongdoing anonymous via an open door policy and the most an employee can 
hope to achieve is confidentiality. However, even if confidentiality is achieved, it is not 
sufficient to protect against the threat of retaliation.
Postal mail. The disclosure of wrongdoing through postal mail allows for 
whistleblowers to maintain high levels of anonymity provided that he or she cannot be 
identified at the time of mailing. However, without providing a return address or contact 
information for the investigator, anonymous, two-way communication is impossible 
through this channel.
Telephone. According to Weaver et al. (1999), 51% of Fortune 1000 firms had 
adopted telephone-based hotline systems for employees to raise complaints before the 
turn of the century. Over a third of the hotlines were directed to employees of the 
organization’s ethics or compliance office. Legal teams and audit departments also 
fielded a large percentage of calls to organizational hotlines (19% and 18%, respectively). 
They further report that other departments and external parties were recipients of hotline 
reports (human resources, 8% of firms; security, 4%; external consultants, 9%; and 
miscellaneous other functions or combined functions, 8%). However, a survey conducted
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by the nonprofit Ethics Resource Center (2010) revealed that only three percent of reports 
about internal misconduct come to company hotlines, with an organization reporting that 
an average of 431 hotline tips are submitted every month, with almost 20 percent of these 
lead to findings of misconduct.
The use of telephone hotlines provides whistleblowers with a convenient method 
of reporting wrongdoing while also allowing clear and efficient two-way communication. 
However, telephone hotlines are unlikely to provide any degree of reasonable anonymity 
protection without additional action on the part of the whistleblower. Firstly, the use of 
any audible communication channel to report wrongdoing is susceptible to voice analysis. 
Secondly, phone calls are easily traced and likely reveal the caller’s phone number 
through standard caller ID services. While determining the physical location of a mobile 
phone takes additional effort and technology, a phone number is all that is needed to 
identify a large portion of the population.
Fax. Although unlikely to be the first choice for most whistleblowers, it is 
possible to submit a report of wrongdoing via fax. While there are more efficient means 
for reporting wrongdoing, the use of a fax machine would allow for the transmission of 
evidence in order to provide supporting documentation for the alleged claims. However, 
just as with the telephone, faxes are easily traceable and can reduce the whistleblower’s 
level of anonymity.
Web forms. The Internet has allowed for wrongdoing to be reported in a variety 
of new ways. The use of online forms to collect desired information from individuals is a 
standard practice in today’s digital age. A primary advantage for the use of web forms is 
that it allows for the recipient to prompt the sender for relevant information using form
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elements such as text fields, check boxes and radio buttons. However, standard use of 
online technology leaks information about the identity of the user. Therefore, a naive user 
who submits his or her allegations through an online web form may result in the 
whistleblower unintentionally revealing information that can be used to determine his or 
her identity.
Email. Some organizations have encouraged employees to submit wrongdoing via 
e-mail. While this channel does provide convenient and efficient two-way 
communication, if the user does not take additional steps to obfuscate his or her identity, 
e-mail does not provide any reasonable level of anonymity protection for a whistleblower 
concerned with the threat of retaliation.
A brief outline of the advantages and disadvantages for each reporting channel is 
provided in Table 2.8. Note that the comparisons have been made under the assumption 
of a naive user. Therefore, the channels are assessed in the context of common usage and 
do not account for additional measures one might employ to increase his or her 
anonymity when communicating via such channels.
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Table 2.8 -  Existing Reporting Channels
Reporting Channel Advantages Disadvantages
Post Mail
High anonymity 
Transmission o f physical 
evidence/documents




Low latency transmission 









Low latency transmission 








NOTE: The advantages and disadvantages for each channel are provided in the context of common usage and do not 
account for additional measures one could take to increase anonymity when using such channels.
Existing Reporting Systems
Before advocating for a particular system design, it is important to first review the 
existing systems currently available. A number of dedicated reporting systems have been 
developed to address the needs of organizations. For example, as many as 35 or more 
companies entered the market in response to the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley (Green, 
2004; Jones, 2003). However, upon review, it appears that most of the proprietary 
systems available on the market fail to achieve adequate anonymity protection. A detailed 
review of existing reporting systems was conducted as part of this research and can be 
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The design of an effective anonymous internal reporting system is complicated by 
the sensitive and competing perspectives of the actors involved: potential whistleblowers, 
investigators and the organization. Therefore, the following sections will discuss the 
potential threats facing each camp of actors with respect to the context of ethics 
management reporting.
Organizational Insiders
Those who elect to disclose wrongdoing are likely to experience threatened or 
actual retaliation (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). From a potential whistleblower’s 
perspective, the internalized motivation to report an observed wrongdoing is met with 
concerns about how his or her report will be received by the organization. Unfortunately, 
these concerns are not unfounded. Employees may perceive that an organization views 
whistleblowers as disloyal employees and a fear of possible retaliation discourages 
internal whistleblowing. While the remedy to the uncertainty around loyalty is best 
addressed by management practices (Near & Miceli, 1996), the threat of retaliation can 
be diminished, if not eliminated, through the use of proper anonymity measures 
(Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2008).
Organizations
Naturally, all organizations would prefer to completely avoid both internal and 
external whistleblowing. With respect to reporting, two perspectives emerge that an 
organization may hold with respect to the disclosure of wrongdoing; that is pro-reporting 
and anti-reporting. From a pro-reporting organization’s perspective, the need to uncover 
and correct unethical or illegal conduct within the organization is paramount. An
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organization in this camp will attempt to eliminate communication barriers between 
employees and management in order to create a culture of open communication, and 
reprimand those who interfere with such attempts.
Conversely, anti-reporting organizations are focused on discouraging and 
suppressing negative reports. For example, a highly autocratic organization might adopt 
this stance in an attempt to maintain absolute control over the dissemination of 
organizational information within the organization as well as what is released externally. 
This may lead organizations to attempt to identify employees who allege wrongdoing 
anonymously. As discussed earlier, while this approach may prove effective in reducing 
internal reporting, it often backfires as it is more likely to result in employees resorting to 
external whistleblowing in the future. Unfortunately, addressing the concerns of 
organizations who are completely opposed to the thought of reporting is outside of the 
scope of this research.
Investigators
From an investigator’s perspective, anonymous disclosures of wrongdoing might 
limit his or her ability to collect credible, detailed and actionable evidence of wrongdoing 
(Near & Miceli, 1995, 1996). Therefore, additional measures must be taken to assist 
those charged with investigating anonymous reports. Further, investigators are often 
employees of the organization in question, such as internal auditors, compliance officers 
or general counsels. The inherent conflict of interest in the relationship between an 
internal investigator and organization has the potential to suppress prohibitive voice, 
which is likely to reduce the incidence of internal reporting. While beyond the scope of 
this research, the use of an independent third party responsible for receiving,
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documenting and relaying reports to the organization is suggested in order to provide 
greater autonomy for the investigator, as well as enhanced anonymity protection for the 
whistleblower.
Internal investigators may also feel pressured by the organization to downplay the 
severity or significance of alleged wrongdoing in order to protect the organization from 
negative consequences. Therefore, in order to ensure a thorough independent 
investigation is possible, it is suggested that investigators be employed by outside 
entities, such as compliance firms. However, the nature of this contractual relationship 
does not completely remove the possibility of an investigator being influenced by his or 
her manager to suppress certain allegations in order to protect the business relationship 
between the compliance firm and the client organization.
Attackers
In the context of whistleblowing, all attackers are likely to be interested in 
identifying or locating users in order to determine the individual(s) responsible for 
reporting or investigation an alleged wrongdoing. Individuals or organizations accused of 
wrongdoing might desire to silence the reporting of the wrongdoing itself, while others 
might be interested in gathering negative information on offending organizations. 
Regardless of an attacker’s motive or relation to a whistleblower, wrongdoer, 
organization or investigator, we must assume that the adversary has one or more of the 
following goals: (1) identify or locate users, (2) track user activities on the Internet,
(3) eavesdrop on communications in transit, or (4) recover sensitive data after system 
shutdown.
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If an attacker succeeds in identifying or locating a user, the user is likely to 
experience undesirable outcomes. As discussed earlier, the probability of whistleblowers 
experiencing some form of retaliation is extremely likely, which makes the preservation 
of anonymity the primary goal. Further, attackers may attempt to intercept or recover 
information by eavesdropping on communications or by analyzing a system suspected of 
being used to electronically communicate wrongdoing. If an attacker succeeds in 
obtaining such information, it will likely identify the alleged wrongdoer(s), but it might 
also identify the whistleblower. Therefore the security of such communications must also 
be of primary concern in order to support the goal of preserving whistleblower 
anonymity.
In protecting against such attempts, system developers must assume that attackers 
are highly skilled and are capable of performing highly technical attacks, such as those 
outlined in the threat model for Tails (The Amnesic Incognito Live System, 2015), which 
is reproduced in Table 2.10. Therefore, each of these capabilities should be kept in mind 
during the design, development and implementation of such a system.
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Table 2.10 -  Capabilities, Methods and Other Means of the Attacker (The Amnesic 
Incognito Live System, 201S)
Capability Description
It is assumed that the adversary is non-global and has full control over the 
network traffic o f some portion of the Internet (e.g. some Tor exit nodes, upstream 
routers of exit nodes, or the ISP that provides the Internet connection the user is 
sitting behind). The adversary is thus able to eavesdrop, modify, delete or delay 




It is conceivable for attackers to mount attacks which bypass the proxy and DNS 
setup in the applications which could then be used to identify the user, either by 




The attacker might be able to run arbitrary code by exploiting vulnerabilities 
present in any o f the software packages installed.
The attacker can utilize certain applications' services and features to get 
identifying information. Examples are JavaScript and Java applets in web 
browsers, CTCP queries in IRC clients, etc.
Application level 
attacks
Some users face adversaries with intermittent or constant physical access to the 
equipment they use. Users in Internet cafes, for example, face such a threat. This 
means the adversary might be physically monitoring the computer while the 
PELD is running on it. Moreover the adversary might raid the user at any moment 








This review of the literature, existing reporting systems and threat analysis raises 
the following primary research questions: (1) How can reporting system design better 
protect whistleblower anonymity? (2) How can reporting system design allow for 
anonymous, two-way communication between the whistleblower and investigator?
(3) How can an investigator’s ability to assess whistleblower credibility be improved 
when using an anonymous reporting system? With these questions in mind, the remainder 
of this chapter will propose a system design and explain the features necessary to support 
the reporting of wrongdoing in a safe and effective manner.
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Design Principles
Prior to developing a proposed design for any system, it is wise to establish a set 
of principles by which the design process can be guided. As such, it is argued that the 
design of an ethics management system should preserve the user freedoms espoused by 
free software. Further, the proposed system should also satisfy the principles for 
cryptography espoused by Kerckhoffs (1883).
Free Software
Free software is primarily focused on respecting users’ freedom and does not 
necessarily mean that the software is provided without cost. According to the Free 
Software Foundation (2015), free software means that “users have the freedom to run, 
copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software.” Therefore, to be considered 
free software, it must respect four essential user freedoms (Table 2.11): (0) the freedom 
to run the program as you wish, for any purpose; (1) the freedom to study how the 
program works, and change it so it does your computing as you wish; (2) the freedom to 
redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor; (3) the freedom to distribute copies of 
your modified versions to others.
Table 2.11 — Essential Freedoms of Free Software (Free Software Foundation, 2015)
Freedom Description
0 The freedom to run the program as you wish, for any purpose
j The freedom to study how the program works, and change it so it does your
computing as you wish. Access to the source code is a precondition for this.
2 The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor.
The freedom to distribute copies of your modified versions to others. By
3 doing this you can give the whole community a chance to benefit from your 
changes. Access to the source code is a precondition for this.
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In order to satisfy the requirements of freedoms 1 and 3, all free software must 
make the source code available for review. While all of the freedoms espoused by the 
Free Software Foundation are worthy pillars for the development of all systems, the 
proposed system needs to guarantee such freedoms in order to ensure transparency. 
Complete transparency is necessary due to the sensitive nature of whistleblowing and the 
high level of risk many whistleblowers assume in disclosing wrongdoing. Without the 
ability to thoroughly review the source code, those who wish to come forward and 
disclose wrongdoing cannot trust that the system will provide adequate anonymity 
protection or ensure that it has not been compromised in an effort to turn the system into 
a “honey pot.”
In adherence with these freedoms, all of the technical capabilities necessary for 
the proposed system can be achieved through the use of free software. Specifically, 
software such as the Tor Anonymity Network, The Amnesic Incognito Live System 
(Tails), and the Metadata Anonymization Tool (MAT) are all available in accordance 
with the free software definition. Each of the aforementioned software may also be 
downloaded and utilized without cost, although it is not required in order to be 
considered free software.
Kerckhoffs’ Principles for Cryptography
In what is considered one of the most complete, yet concise, works on 
cryptography, Auguste Kerckhoffs (1883) outlines six principles which must be 
considered prior to selecting a field cipher. Kahn's (1996) translation of these principles 
from French to English is reproduced in Table 2.12, and outlined as follows: (1) the 
system should be, if not theoretically unbreakable, unbreakable in practice;
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(2) compromise of the system should not inconvenience the correspondents; (3) the key 
should be rememberable without notes and should be easily changeable; (4) the 
cryptograms should be transmittable by telegraph; (5) the apparatus or documents should 
be portable and operable by a single person; (6) the system should be easy, neither 
requiring knowledge of a long list of rules nor involving mental strain.
Table 2.12 -  Kerckhoffs’ Principles for Cryptography (Kahn, 1996, p. 235)
Principle Description
1 The system should be, if not theoretically unbreakable, unbreakable in practice.
2 Compromise o f the system should not inconvenience the correspondents.
3 The key should be rememberable without notes and should be easily changeable.
4 The cryptograms should be transmittable by telegraph.
5 The apparatus or documents should be portable and operable by a single person.
6 The system should be easy, neither requiring knowledge o f a long list of rules nor involving mental strain.
Although Kerckhoffs’ principles were intended for cryptograms, they serve as 
useful guidelines for all aspects of systems which intend to protect the transmission of 
sensitive information. While satisfying all six principles can be quite challenging, each of 
the technological measures included in the proposed design is intended to meet or exceed 
one or more of Kerckhoffs’ principles.
Proposed System Design 
An illustration of the proposed system design is provided in Figure 2.6. While an 
organization can employ the proposed system for each of the four types of ethics 
management reporting, the illustration is geared towards external reporting. Further, the
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design is largely based upon the architecture of the SecureDrop system, as the features 
and methods of that system currently provide the highest performance guarantees in 
terms of anonymity and security. Each of the system features in the illustration, as well as 
others not depicted, will be discussed in detail in the following sections.
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Whistleblower 













Document Viewing System 
Air Gapped Environment





Figure 2.6 — Overview of the Proposed System Design
The illustration includes the following users: whistleblower, investigator and 
system administrator. Prior to accessing the system, both whistleblowers and 
investigators are encouraged to use The Amnesic Incognito Live System (Tails) to
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increase user anonymity and security. All transmissions to and from the users of the 
system are encrypted from end-to-end prior to being are routed through the Tor 
Anonymity Network. The encrypted communications and any relevant documents 
accompanying a message must be extracted and transported from the server to a 
document viewing station equipped with a system not connected to the Internet. Further, 
the use of a secure, air-gapped environment, ideally protected by a Faraday cage, ensures 
that the contents of each transmission is only viewable within the authorized area.
After investigators review the information provided in the transmission, they may 
communicate with the whistleblower to request additional information. Prior to extracting 
the necessary information to compile a report of the wrongdoing, all potentially 
identifying information should be scrubbed from the documents and information 
provided in order to protect the whistleblower. After doing so, the information relevant to 
the report may be extracted from the secure viewing station to another system outside of 
the document viewing area. Investigators may then generate the report intended to be sent 
to the organization in order to inform them of the allegations and subsequent 
investigation.
System Use Case
The system use case for interacting with system is fairly straight-forward and is 
illustrated in Figure 2.7. A user wishing to report a given wrongdoing for the first time 
will submit their information via the system. After submission, the user will be provided 
with a system-generated passphrase comprised of random words. It is critical that the user 
commit the passphrase to memory and not compromise its secrecy as it is the only means 
by which a user can access a prior submission. Upon returning to the system, existing
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whistleblowers simply enter the passphrase associated with their original report to check 
the status of their case and to view and respond to any messages provided from an 
investigator.
N ew  W h is tle b lo w e r
In v e s t ig a to r
E xisting  W h is tle b lo w e r





S e n d  /  V iew
R ece iv e
■ C reate
Figure 2.7 -  Use Case for the Proposed System
Upon receipt of a new report, the investigator may create a case and review the 
information provided by the whistleblower. The use of a case allows for all of the 
messages to be associated with a single whistleblower, as well as communicate the status 
of the investigation. Investigators may send messages to the whistleblower in order to 
clarify aspects of the submission and to request additional supporting information 
deemed relevant to the investigation.
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System Features
In order to best satisfy the desires of each camp of actors while also fostering 
effective reporting, the following primary features of an anonymous, two-way ethics 
management reporting system will be proposed. The system features consist of: (1) data 
encryption, (2) the Tor Anonymity Network, (3) The Amnesic Incognito Live System 
(Tails), (4) metadata anonymization, (5) user identification and authentication, (6) two- 
way anonymous messaging, (7) investigation status, and (8) text analysis. Aside from 
investigation status, each of the features can be organized into three primary functional 
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Data encryption involves the use of algorithms to obfuscate the true meaning of 
content. The development of encryption standards assumes that such information can and 
will be intercepted. Therefore, encryption is used solely to ensure that the content of 
sensitive information is not accessible by those unauthorized to view it. There are three 
types of encryption algorithms: (1) symmetric, (2) asymmetric, and (3) hashing. Each of 
these algorithm types, as well as the concept offorward secrecy, will be discussed.
Symmetric algorithms. Symmetric algorithms are designed to use the same secret 
key for both encrypting and decrypting data. Examples of symmetric encryption include 
the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and the 
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA). Because the use of symmetric 
encryption requires sharing the same secret with those involved in the conversation, a 
separate key must be generated for each conversation. Otherwise, the holder of a secret 
key for one conversation could decrypt the contents of another. The need to generate a 
separate secret key for each and every conversation is one of the major disadvantages of 
symmetric encryption. However, the simplicity of using a single key for encryption and 
decryption results in a far more efficient algorithm.
Asymmetric encryption. Asymmetric algorithms utilize key pairs consisting of a 
public key and private key, rather than relying on a single shared secret key. Both keys of 
each key pair are generated in such a way that if data is encrypted using the public key, it 
can only be decrypted by the private key. Knowledge of the public key does not 
jeopardize the private key, which allows for a single key pair to be generated for all 
communications, rather than secret keys for each conversation as is required in
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symmetric encryption. Examples of asymmetric encryption include RSA, named after 
Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman (1978), and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), which was first 
released by Phil Zimmermann in 1991.
Forward secrecy. While public-key cryptography is highly effective, it is 
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Therefore, in order to satisfy Kerckhoffs (1883) 
first three principles, one should seek to implement cryptography which affords its users 
forward secrecy, which ensures that prior communications are not vulnerable if a key is 
compromised in the future. Forward secrecy was first conceptualized by Merkle (1978). 
However, due to the delay of peer-review, is it actually Diffie & Heilman (1976) who are 
commonly credited with the first published protocol for forward secrecy. However, in a 
retrospective introduction to a reprint of Diffie & Heilman's (1976) original paper, 
Heilman (2002) has since requested that future mention of the protocol be referred to as 
the Diffie-Hellman—Merkle key exchange, in recognition of Merkle’s earlier 
conceptualization of the public key distribution system.
Tor Anonymity Network
The original purpose of onion routing was only to anonymize the online 
communication of military intelligence. The Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) also contributed to the development and funding of the research 
project. Although onion routing was promising in theory, it was easy to recognize the 
traffic as military communications since all of the nodes participating in circuits belonged 
to the military. This limitation prevented the military from achieving the desired level of 
anonymity.
59
To address this issue, it was decided to publicly release the onion routing protocol 
in hopes that civilian users would volunteer their devices to participate as nodes in onion 
routing circuits. Syverson then teamed with MIT researchers Nick Mathewson and Roger 
Dingledine to develop a useable tool for anonymous communications, which was first 
released in 2002. Their efforts ultimately led to the creation of the Tor Project, a non­
profit organization currently responsible for the management of the Tor Anonymity 
Network and the Tor Browser Bundle. Tor stands for The Onion Router, but is stylized as 
simply Tor.
The Tor Anonymity Network relies upon the original onion routing concept and a 
volunteer network of thousands of users around the world. Each of these volunteers 
provide access to a device in order for it to be used as a node in the onion routing 
protocol. Each onion routing circuit consists of three volunteer nodes, with the first and 
last node referred to as the guard relay and exit relay, respectively. The transmissions 
through the Tor circuit are encrypted in layers of AES encryption so that each node can 




Figure 2.8 -  Onion Routing
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Communications relying upon the Tor network are routed through randomly 
generated Tor circuits. These circuits are automatically generated by the Tor client after 
obtaining a list of available volunteer nodes from a directory server (Figure 2.9). The Tor 
circuit is then established among all three of the selected nodes (Figure 2.10). After a 
predefined time interval, or upon visiting a new site, a new circuit is generated (Figure 
2 .11).
E S  How Tor Works: 1
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client obtains a list m h
of Tor nodes from Q
a directory server. — >-
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Figure 2.9 -  How Tor Works: 1 (The Tor Project, 2015b)
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Figure 2.10 -  How Tor Works: 2 (The Tor Project, 2015b)
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Figure 2.11 -  How Tor Works: 3 (The Tor Project, 2015b)
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Common attacks. Tor is vulnerable to some known attacks, such as timing 
analysis, intersection attacks, exit node sniffing. However, none of the vulnerabilities 
known to date are capable of identifying a specific target user. Instead, these attacks have 
the potential to reveal the identity of an extremely small subset of users. Therefore, the 
use of the Tor Anonymity Network provides the greatest level of anonymity protection 
currently available for common users.
Tor Browser Bundle. In order to provide a user-friendly tool for utilizing the Tor, 
The Tor Project Based developed the Tor Browser Bundle, which is a modified version 
of the Mozilla Firefox browser configured to only transmit communications through the 
Tor Anonymity Network. Although the Tor Browser Bundle does require downloading 
and familiarizing oneself with a new browser, the similarities with common browsers 
results in a minimal learning curve. However, due to the additional hops and layers of 
encryption involved in onion routing, users will experience an increased latency in 
communications routed through the Tor anonymity network. However, the latency is 
minimal and should not be noticeable to the user.
Tor Hidden Services. Not only can users protect the IP address of their device, 
but server administrators can also utilize onion routing to protect the location of their 
server. This can be achieved through the use of Tor Hidden Services. Servers employing 
Tor Hidden Services are not accessible by standard web browsers because they do not 
rely upon the standard Domain Name Server (DNS) for regular websites as it would 
prevent the anonymization of the IP address. Instead, a randomly generated address for 
the server is generated and must be provided to users wishing to access it.
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While hidden services not being accessible by standard browsers might normally 
be considered a negative, this is actually a strength for the purposes of the proposed 
system as it forces users to download the Tor Browser Bundle and therefore prevents 
users from accidentally revealing their identity. However, this obviously requires that the 
user familiarize his or herself with the Tor Browser prior to submitting a report. A second 
strength of utilizing Tor Hidden Services is that it provides full end-to-end encryption by 
completely encrypting the entire path through two Tor circuits.
In order to establish communication with a Tor Hidden Service, the server must 
first establish Tor circuits to introduction points (IP), which will later be used to establish 
first contact between visitors and server (Figure 2.12). After the introduction points have 
been determined, their locations are published in a database for hidden services (Figure 
2.13). A user who wishes to access the hidden service then sets up his or her own Tor 
circuit to a random rendezvous point, then looks up the introduction points from the 
directory and establishes Tor circuits to the IPs (Figure 2.14). The Tor client then asks 
one of the servers IPs to share the location of the rendezvous point with the server (Figure 
2.15). Once the server learns of the location of the rendezvous point, it establishes a Tor 
circuit (Figure 2.16), completing both circuits between the user and hidden service so that 
anonymous communication can commence (Figure 2.17).
64
T if  Hidden Services: 1
Step 1: Bob picks some 
introduction points and 




J T A T w d r a a
■ ■ Introduction points
C E S  Public key
S B One-time ascrat
■ ■ Rendezvous point
Figure 2.12 — Tor Hidden Services: 1 (The Tor Project, 2015a)
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Figure 2.13 -  Tor Hidden Services: 2 (The Tor Project, 2015a)
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Figure 2.14 -  Tor Hidden Services: 3 (The Tor Project, 2015a)
T<£f Hidden Services: 4
Step 4: Alice writes a 
message to Bob 
(encrypted to PK) listing 
the rendezvous point 
and a one-lime secret 
and asks an introduction
Tordoud 
Tor circuit
Figure 2.15 -  Tor Hidden Services: 4 (The Tor Project, 2015a)
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Figure 2.16 -  Tor Hidden Services: 5 (The Tor Project, 2015a)
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Figure 2.17 -  Tor Hidden Services: 6 (The Tor Project, 2015a)
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Although Tor provides the strongest anonymity protection currently available via 
onion routing, a new system called HORNET (High-speed Onion Routing at the Network 
Layer) has been proposed which aims to provide enhanced performance in terms of speed 
and scalability (Chen, Asoni, Barrera, Danezis, & Perrig, 2015).
The Amnesic Incognito Live System (Tails)
The Amnesic Incognito Live Systems, commonly known as Tails, is a live 
operating system designed to employ a number of privacy and anonymity measures, such 
as encryption and the Tor anonymity network, by default. As a live operating system, 
Tails can be used independently from a computer’s original operating system by booting 
from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card.
The primary security feature of Tails is that it utilizes the host system’s RAM 
memory, rather than writing to the hard disk drive, in order to have an “amnesic” 
memory. In doing so, any data stored in the RAM during the session is wiped clean after 
shutting down Tails. This allows the user to work on sensitive materials without leaving a 
trace on the host system. Therefore, the use of Tails can benefit both the whistleblower 
and the investigator by protecting the transmission of sensitive communication and 
documents prior to and following submission.
Metadata Anonvmization
Meta-data is simply data which describe data. Just as academia relies on blind 
peer-review to ensure fair and objective evaluation of research, anonymous 
whistleblowers need to be assured that the chosen channel will protect them from the 
threat of retaliation. Unfortunately, users who have clear and justifiable reasons for 
remaining anonymous might fail to remove meta-data from supporting documentation,
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which might inadvertently reveal their identities. For example, Young (2006) explains 
how the identity of a peer reviewer was unintentionally revealed to an author due to the 
meta-data stored in the Microsoft Word document which contained the reviewer’s 
feedback.
While it would be wise for users to scrub any files of all meta-data prior to 
submission, it would be a disservice to the user not to include additional measures to 
automatically remove information which has the potential to compromise his or her 
identity. Therefore, whistleblowers that provide supporting documentation to support 
their allegations must have protections in place to ensure that such meta-data does not 
jeopardize their anonymity. There are limited tools currently available to incorporate 
directly into an online reporting system and it would be best for a custom solution to be 
developed for this purpose. However, one promising open-source application to consider 
is the Metadata Anonymisation Toolkit (MAT). MAT is already included in distributions 
of Tails, but requires the user to remove the metadata from documents prior to 
submission. Instead, it is suggested that an automatic process for removing metadata from 
documents be incorporated into the design of the system. A complete description of the 
program (https://mat.boum.org/) and a repository for the MAT source code can be 
reviewed online (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/jvoisin/mat.git).
User Authentication
Authentication is the process of confirming user identity. Proper user 
authentication is critical to the security of any sensitive information. Since the publication 
of the Rainbow Series of U.S. Department of Defense guidelines (National Computer 
Security Center, 1991), authentication factors have been generally grouped into the
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following categories: something users know (knowledge), something users have 
(ownership), and something users are (inherence). Knowledge factors consist of things 
the user knows, such as passwords, passphrases, and PINs (personal identification) 
numbers, as well as information about one’s self or family. Possession factors refer to 
physical objects the user has, such as real and electronic keys, driver’s license, and 
security tokens. Inherence factors, as the name suggest, are inherent to the user and 
largely consist of biometric characteristics, such as finger prints, facial recognition, and 
retinal patterns. Since the original categorization, additional factors have emerged: what 
users do {active) and where users are {location). Active factors involves dynamic 
biometrics to capture subconscious behavior, such as typing patterns or walking gait, 
while location factors ensure that users are in authorized areas prior to granting access, as 
can be determined with global positioning systems (GPS). The advantages and 
disadvantages, as well as examples of each factor are outlined in Table 2.14.
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Table 2.14 -  Advantages and Disadvantages of Authentication Factors








Can be changed as needed
Easier to guard than 
physical objects
Could be forgotten 
If written down, could be 
lost, stolen or 
compromised 
Easily duplicated by 
guessing
Ownership
Physical keys; Security 
tokens; Mobile devices; 
Identification cards; 
Security tokens; Radio 
Frequency Identification 
(RFID)
More difficult to duplicate 
Multiple physical objects to 
use
More difficult to guard than 
knowledge
Requires carrying a 
physical object
Could be lost, stolen or 
compromised
Inherence
Facial, retinal or iris 
patterns; Fingerprints; 
Hand geometry; DNA
Extremely difficult to 
duplicate
Multiple biometric options 
to use
Specialized equipment 





Typing patterns; Walking 
gait; Writing patterns and 
hand pressure
Extremely difficult to 
duplicate
Specialized equipment 
required to distinguish 
characteristics
Location
Physical access controls; 
Global Positioning 
System (GPS); Signal 
triangulation
Difficult to duplicate 
Must be in an authorized 
area to access the system
Specialized equipment 
required to determine 
location
Location can be spoofed
Must detect and rescind 
access when location is 
no longer satisfied
Multifactor authentication. To achieve the highest degree of security, systems 
should employ multifactor authentication. Multifactor authentication requires the use of 
one or more types of authentication methods from one or more of the factors, such as 
coupling a password with a physical security token. Single factor authentication (SFA) 
only requires the use of one factor, which may even be limited to a single method, such
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as a known password. Two-factor authentication (2FA) would require the use of an 
additional factor, such as the use of a password and fingerprint to access a system. 
Accordingly, three-factor authentication (3FA) involves the combination of at least one 
method from three factors, such as the use of a PIN number, security identification card, 
and retinal scan.
It is important to reiterate that the use of multiple methods from the same factor 
does not adequately increase security as each of the methods used would be vulnerable to 
the same threats. For example, if a purse is stolen, the victim is likely to lose their 
identification, physical keys and cell phone. All three of these items could be used to 
authenticate a user through ownership, but they were all compromised simultaneously 
with a single act of theft. If a system relied upon ownership methods alone, the thief 
would have very little trouble being authenticated and granted access. Therefore, 
multifactor authentication (MFA) is desired because the chances of obtaining both secret 
knowledge and the physical device is far more challenging than obtaining only one of the 
two. However, anything greater than single factor authentication is not suitable in the 
context of anonymous whistleblowing as using anything but secret knowledge would 
require identifying the user from the beginning. Instead, the best option is to ensure that 
the knowledge factor is as strong as possible, which brings us to a discussion on 
passwords and passphrases.
Passwords. While there are many types of authentication methods, the most 
commonly used method for online access is the combination of a username and 
password, both of which are knowledge factors. Oftentimes a username for authentication 
purposes is publicly available (e.g., employee email directory), rendering it useless in
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terms of secret knowledge. Furthermore, usernames are typically generated and chosen 
by the user, limiting their anonymity potential. A better approach would be to utilize 
system generated passphrases.
Passphrases. Although passwords are commonly required to include special 
characters or at least one capitalized letter, the primary determinant of strength for a 
given password is actually its length, not the complexity of its characters. It is critical to 
use passphrases when encrypting data because adversaries can make an unlimited number 
of attempts to guess the passphrase and are therefore only limited by the resources 
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Authenticating whistleblowers. Upon submission of the initial report, 
whistleblowers should be provided with a system generated random passphrase. This 
passphrase will be the only way for the whistleblower to access his or her prior 
submission. By preventing the user from entering their own passphrase, the system 
design is able to better protect naive users from utilizing weak or identifiable passphrases. 
Further, the use of system generated passphrases allows for anonymous, two-way 
communication, which will be discussed in greater detail in a later section.
Authenticating investigators. Due to the sensitive nature of the information likely 
to be shared via the system, it is imperative that access only be granted to authorized 
investigators. Therefore, it is an absolute must for multifactor authentication to be 
employed prior. This should include physical security controls in addition to standard 
authentication methods.
Two-Way Anonymous Messaging
Providing users with a randomly generated passphrase upon submission of the 
initial report allows for the user to reference the case during a subsequent visit to the 
system. Doing so allows for investigators to leave messages for whistleblowers within the 
system, which may be used to request clarification of the original submission or 
additional information. Messages should be automatically deleted after a given time 
interval in order to prevent the system server from becoming a repository of secrets. The 
server is already considered a likely target for attackers, but if sensitive information is 
known to be stored indefinitely, the motivation for attacks will increase.
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Investigation Status
In addition to two-way communication, it is highly suggested that standardized 
stages of investigations be established so that the status of a particular case can be easily 
communicated to the whistleblower upon follow up. The status can be communicated by 
simply indicating the stages of the process, as well as a description and expectations for 
each. This will aid the whistleblower throughout the process of disclosing wrongdoing by 
keeping them informed of the investigation.
Text-Analysis
While the previous system features have focused primarily on improving the 
experience for the whistleblower, either in terms of security, anonymity or convenience, 
the final feature is solely intended to assist investigators. Due to the perception that 
anonymous sources of information are less credible, investigators must rely upon more 
objective measures for determining whether alleged wrongdoing is truly credible. One 
such option for an objective measure of credibility would be through the use of text 
analysis. For example, text analysis has been used to detect deception in written 
statements (Fuller, Biros, & Delen, 2011; Fuller, Biros, & Wilson, 2009). Incorporating 
text analysis into the operation of the system would not only allow for written 
communication from whistleblowers to be analyzed for indicators of deception, but it 
could also be utilized for assessing credibility itself.
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Additional Considerations
Best Practices for Investigators
It is suggested that investigations be conducted by teams with at least three 
members, rather than assigning reports to individual investigators. This can be enforced 
via authentication and encryption, which prevents decrypting submissions until all 
members of the investigation team have provided their authentication signature. Ideally, 
the authentication for investigators would involve multi-factor authentication, including 
biometric security measures.
Investigators should also never request that responses be sent or received at a 
specific time. Instead, a reasonable window of time by which to expect a response should 
be used. This allows the whistleblower to provide a response at a time he or she perceives 
to be safest opportunity.
In order to further protect the security and anonymity of users, each message 
received via the system should be permanently deleted from the system by the 
investigator after viewing. A record of the information provided in the transmissions can 
be kept in a secure location elsewhere, but should not be retained within the system to 
prevent unauthorized access to the case history.
Reporting Metrics
In order to facilitate system and organizational improvement, it is suggested that 
metrics be calculated to assess performance of the system and organization. For example, 
according to Penman & O’Mara (2014), NAVEX Global currently calculates a number of 
reporting benchmarks across all organizations serviced by their EthicsPoint system, such 
as: types of wrongdoing reported, number of allegations vs. inquiries, report sources
76
(e.g., groups, locations, business units, departments), levels of employee reporting 
(e.g., entry-level, middle management), characteristics of anonymous reports, discipline 
or remediation actions taken, report substantiation rate, report volume, number of 
retaliation cases and outcomes, and case closure time.
Contributions
This research has provided a number of significant contributions to research and 
practice. First, this chapter addresses the critical need for the design of an anonymous 
ethics management system. Second, the proposed system includes the addition of two- 
way communication capabilities between an anonymous whistleblower and investigator, 
which has yet to be suggested as a possibility in the whistleblowing literature. This 
technological advancement has the potential to bridge the perceived credibility gap 
between anonymous and identified whistleblower reports. Addressing this issue will have 
tremendous implications for practice in that unethical or illegal behavior reported by 
anonymous sources will receive greater consideration by investigators. Third, the ability 
to protect whistleblower anonymity at the system level is the best method for 
dramatically reducing the incidence of whistleblower retaliation. Fourth, the development 
of a system that might be preferred over other existing reporting channels by potential 
whistleblowers would provide organizations with a more effective method of soliciting 
information regarding unethical or illegal behavior within the organization. An increase 
in internal reports will provide greater insight into potential problems within the 




The ability for organizations to solicit information on unethical or illegal behavior 
that would otherwise go unreported provides a significant increase in the ability of the 
organization to maintain an ethical environment and protect itself from the negative 
financial, legal and public relations impact such revelations can have on the organization. 
However, creating an organizational culture that is supportive of whistleblowing and 
providing an acceptable channel of communication for organizational insiders is 
challenging due to the sensitive nature of reporting concerns, misconduct and 
wrongdoing. Therefore, implementing an anonymous ethics management reporting 
system which utilizes the design to be proposed in this dissertation will allow for 
improvements in the protection of whistleblowers against retaliation, encourage increased 
levels of internal reporting, reduce the occurrence of external whistleblowing and provide 
organizations with the ability to correct unethical or illegal behavior as soon as possible 
in order to limit the potential damage to the financial, legal and public relations interests 
of organizations.
CHAPTER THREE
THE IMPACT OF ANONYMOUS, TWO-WAY 
COMMUNICATION ON PERCEIVED 
WHISTLEBLOWER CREDIBILITY
Introduction
A widely held and uncontested theory in existing whistleblowing research 
portends that anonymous reports of wrongdoing are perceived by investigators as less 
credible than those from identified individuals. However, despite its use in practice, prior 
whistleblowing research has failed to consider and incorporate two-way communication 
between whistleblowers and investigators charged with assessing reports of alleged 
wrongdoing. Thus, this chapter will investigate the impact of two-way communication on 
this phenomenon, with special attention paid to how investigator perceptions of 
anonymous reports can be improved using two-way communication by engaging in an 
asynchronous, computer-mediated dialogue with whistleblowers.
This study reviews existing theories in whistleblowing research and relies upon 
communication research, both inter-personal and computer-mediated, to address the 
limitations of prior theory regarding investigator perceptions of anonymous 
whistleblowers. In order to assess these perceptions, investigators were solicited from a 
number of professional organizations to participate in an online experiment. The
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experiment tasked subjects with evaluating simulated two-way communication between 
an investigator and an employee attempting to blow the whistle on financial wrongdoing. 
The theorized relationships and a number of rival explanations were examined in order to 
account for potential confounds. The empirical results of the study are provided and the 
implications of the findings are discussed in detail.
Literature Review
Prior to investigating the primary purpose of this study, it is imperative to review 
the existing research relevant to this phenomenon. This review of the literature begins 
with basic communication models, continues with computer-mediated communication, 
and then addresses the role of anonymous communication in the whistleblowing context.
Models of Communication
Shannon's (1948) model of communication, illustrated in Figure 3.1, consists of 
the following components: information source, transmitter, channel, receiver, destination 
and noise source. The information source (i.e., sender) produces information to be 
transmitted. The information is then encoded by a transmitter, transmitted via a channel, 
and ultimately decoded by the receiver, in order for the destination to interpret the 








Figure 3.1 -  Shannon's (1948) Model of the Communication Process
While Shannon’s model is referred to as the first conceptualization of the 
communication process, it was originally developed for Bell Systems to assist in the 
development of telephone systems. Therefore, a non-technical model of inter-personal 
communication was developed by David Berio (1960) in order to simplify the basic 
communication process. This model was coined the Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver 
(SMCR) Model of Communication, and is provided in Figure 3.2.
ENCODES DECODESMESSAGESENDER
Channel Channel
Figure 3.2 -  Berio's (1960) SMCR Model of Communication
However, both models are limited to one-way communication due to the 
unidirectional nature of such transmissions. Common examples of one-way 
communication consist of radio and television, as the audience cannot respond to the 
broadcast. Thus, the inability for the receiver to communicate with the sender in one-way
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transmissions may result in a breakdown in communication as the sender cannot verify 
that the receiver properly received or understood the message.
Bamlund's (1970) addition of feedback to earlier models helps address this issue. 
This reciprocal, two-way communication method allows for a more thorough exchange of 
information as the receiver can provide feedback to the sender in order to ask for 
clarification or confirmation of the original message. An illustration of Berio's (1960) 
SMRC Model with the inclusion of Bamlund's (1970) feedback is provided in Figure 3.3. 
Note that Bamlund (1970) does not explicitly designate a sender or receiver since both 













Figure 3.3 -  Addition of Barnlund's (1970) Feedback to Berio's (1960) SMRC Model
The use of feedback also allows the receiver to communicate, both verbally and 
nonverbally, with the original sender in response to his or her message. For example, 
facial expressions and body language can provide the sender with nonverbal behavioral 
cues from the receiver, which informs the sender of communication effectiveness. 
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Figure 3.4 -  Barnlund's (1970) Transactional Model of Communication
Media Richness Theory
In addition to feedback, it is especially important to note Barnlund's (1970) 
inclusion of both verbal and nonverbal behavioral cues when assessing the effectiveness 
of communication. However, such cues are only available if the given medium allows for 
individuals to transmit and perceive them. Daft & Lengel (1984) classified various 
communication mediums into a hierarchy of media richness (Table 3.1) based upon 
common characteristics, such as the celerity of feedback, types of channels and cues, 
source and language. For example, reports provide only written language, whereas face- 
to-face conversations allow for the use of oral communication, facial expression, body 
language and immediate feedback.
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Table 3.1 -  Daft & Lengel's (1984) Hierarchy of Media Richness
Increasing
Media Media Classification
M edia C haracteristics
Richness Feedback i~nanneis & Cues Source Language
A
Face-to-face Oral Immediate Audio & Visual Personal Natural
Telephone Oral Fast Audio Personal Natural
Addressed
Documents 










Written Slowest LimitedVisual Impersonal
Numeric or 
Natural
Media richness theory posits that communication which is conducted via leaner 
mediums will result in less effective communication due to the reduction in information 
that can be transmitted within a given time interval (Figure 3.5). For instance, Kalman & 
Rafaeli (2011) relied upon expectancy theory in order to examine how violations of 
norms for computer-mediated communication impact perceptions of the relationship 
between sender and receiver. Specifically, their research found that unexpected pauses in 
the communication might cause participants to question the intentions of the intended 
recipient. For example, if a recipient of an email or other asynchronous communication 
does not acknowledge its receipt or respond within the sender’s expected length of time 
for a response, the sender may begin to question whether the recipient is intentionally 
ignoring the message. Further, Kalman & Rafaeli (2011) found that the lack of response 
is likely to increase this perception as more time passes. Common solutions to this
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particular issue involve the use of “auto-reply” or “out of the office” messages which can 
be sent by the email client when the user is unavailable.
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Figure 3.5 -  Communication Effectiveness Continuum for Common Mediums
Communication in Whistleblowing
As discussed in Chapter 2, a number of internal and external channels are 
available for employees to blow the whistle and report wrongdoing. Unfortunately, due to 
the context of the current research, verbal communication, whether in person or by 
phone, is not desirable for reporting wrongdoing due to its inability to preserve 
anonymity. As also explained in Chapter 2, a number of modem technical measures can 
be implemented in order to allow for anonymous, two-way communication with 
investigators. With this fact in mind, computer-mediated communication is the best 
alternative medium for maintaining anonymity without resorting to one-way 
communication. Therefore, some media richness must be sacrificed for the sake of
85
preserving anonymity in order to provide whistleblowers with the highest level of 
protection from potential retaliation.
Role of anonymity. As previously discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, anonymity is of 
prime importance when concerned with protecting whistleblowers from retaliation. 
Anonymity measures incorporated into policies, procedures and systems for the reporting 
of wrongdoing can help alleviate the threat of retaliation. This issue is due to the fact that 
employees perceive reporting via anonymous channels as less likely to result in 
employment loss, reputation loss, or harassment (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan & 
Schultz, 2006, 2007; Near & Miceli, 1995, 1996) and has been shown to result in a more 
open and thorough exchange of ideas in computer-mediated communication (Jessup & 
Tansik, 1991).
However, despite all of the advantages for the whistleblower in the reporting of 
wrongdoing, there are a number of drawbacks which may impede investigations. For 
example, Near & Miceli (1995, 1996) have long argued that anonymous whistleblowers 
would be perceived as less credible which may result in less effective investigations. This 
belief is rooted in the argument made by Elliston (1982) that anyone who is alleged to 
have committed wrongdoing or misconduct should have the right to confront the 
individual who alleged the claim. Therefore, if claims are made anonymously, then the 
accused are unable to fully defend themselves. The reduction in credibility may also 
occur if the investigator perceives anonymous reports to be ineffective based upon prior 
experience as investigating anonymous claims are likely to be more time-consuming. 
Anonymous communications also prevent investigators from assessing the status, 
integrity, and motives of the individual alleging wrongdoing, which may result in lower
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levels of perceived credibility (Near & Miceli, 1995, 1996). Despite the longstanding 
theories on the subject, no empirical research had been conducted to verify this 
phenomena.
As previously discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, two-way communication channels 
are already utilized to report alleged wrongdoing. Therefore, the present study seeks to 
assess whether the prior theories hold true when whistleblowers and investigators can 
engage in an active dialogue via anonymous two-way communication.
Hypotheses Development
Based upon the discussion of the literature, one would expect investigators to 
perceive reports from anonymous sources to be less credible than identified reports. This 
expectation forms the basis for the first hypothesis of this study.
H I: Investigators will perceive anonymous reports to be less credible
when compared to identified reports.
Further, one can expect investigators to gain confidence in the assessment of 
credibility when provided with the identity of the author of the report. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis will test this relationship.
H2: Investigators will exhibit more confidence in the assessment of
credibility for identified reports as opposed to anonymous reports.
Due to the expected relationships mentioned in HI and H2, it is anticipated that 
the perceived credibility gap between anonymous and identified reports will result in a 
corresponding gap in resource allocation by investigators. Therefore, the third hypothesis 
will test this relationship.
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H3: Investigators will allocate fewer resources to investigate issues
raised in anonymous whistleblower reports when compared to 
identified reports.
Unfortunately, prior research has neglected to consider the impact of two-way 
communication on investigator perceptions of credibility. Two-way communication is 
important because it allows for feedback back to be exchanged, thereby enriching the 
effectiveness of communication. To test this phenomena, this study will assess how 
obtaining additional information will improve perceptions of whistleblower credibility 
and resource allocation for anonymous reports. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis will 
assess whether investigators who obtain additional information in subsequent 
communications will reach the same assessment of whistleblowers when compared to 
those who obtain all information in a single report submission.
H4a: Investigators who obtain additional substantive information from
whistleblowers will perceive whistleblower credibility similarly to 
those who receive the same amount of information in a single 
report.
H4b: Investigators who obtain additional substantive information from
whistleblowers will allocate investigatory resources similarly to 
those who receive the same amount of information in a single 
report.
Further, when investigators are engaged in two-way communication with a 
whistleblower, it is possible that the perception of credibility and amount of resources 
allocated to investigate alleged wrongdoing might be influenced simply by the number of 
messages rather than any additional substantive information provided. Thus, the fifth 
hypothesis will assess this potential confound on both credibility and resource allocation.
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H5a: Investigators who receive additional communication but are not
provided additional information about the reported wrongdoing 
will perceive higher levels of credibility than those who receive 
additional communication that provides substantive information.
H5a: Investigators who receive additional communication but are not
provided additional information about the reported wrongdoing 
will allocate fewer investigatory resources than those who receive 
additional communication that provides substantive information.
Based upon the expectancy violation found in computer-mediated communication 
when a response is not provided in a timely fashion (Kalman & Rafaeli, 2011), it is 
hypothesized that investigators will perceive whistleblowers to be less credible if they fail 
to respond to requests for additional information.
H6: Investigators who do not receive further communication from
whistleblowers beyond the initial report will perceive the 
whistleblower to be less credible than those who receive further 
communication.
However, it is also theorized that if the whistleblower responds, but is simply 
unwilling to provide additional information out of concern for his or her well-being due 
to the threat of retaliation, investigators will understand and recognize this reality without 
any significant reduction in the perception of whistleblower credibility.
H7: Investigators who receive further communication from
whistleblowers, but are provided with no new information will not 
exhibit a significant reduction in perceived whistleblower 
credibility when compared to those who receive more information.
Lastly, but most importantly, the efficacy of two-way communication must be 
shown to achieve equal or better results when compared to one-way communication. 
Therefore, the final hypothesis of this study will compare perceptions of credibility 
between those who engage in both one- and two-way communication.
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H8: The credibility of anonymous whistleblowers who engage in two-
way communication with investigators will be perceived as equally 
credible when compared to identified whistleblowers who do not 
engage in two-way communication.
Methodology
Participants
Compliance officers and accounting professionals served as the primary target 
populations for this study as they have the necessary education and experience to 
evaluate reports of financial misconduct. Participants were recruited by soliciting 
members of a number of professional associations. Compliance professionals were 
contacted through the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE). Accounting 
professionals were recruited from the Association for Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA). Prior to participating, study subjects were offered the opportunity 
to have a $3.00 (USD) donation made on their behalf to a non-profit organization of their 
choice in exchange for participating in the study.
Experimental Design
A randomized, 2 x 5  between-subjects experimental design was employed in this 
study. The experiment was conducted online and simulated the communication between 
an investigator and an employee. The two experimental factors for this study consist of 
anonymity (i.e., anonymous or identified) and five levels of simulated communication, 
each of which manipulate the number of messages provided by the whistleblower and the 
amount of information contained within each.
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Procedure
Participants were asked to read and review background information (Figure 3.6) 
which tasked them with assuming the role of an outside compliance consultant by a 
fictitious company, Vitrum Technologies, Inc. In this position, participants would be 
responsible for reviewing a whistleblowing communication exchange between an 
employee and investigator via an internal reporting system.
Please read the following background information before proceeding to the next page.
You have recently been hired by Vitrum Technologies, Inc. to serve as an outside compliance consultant. 
Vitrum is a U.S.-based, publicly-traded company that develops, manufactures, and markets high- 
performance film-coated glass used in such products as computer screens, photocopiers, and projection 
televisions. The company was incorporated in 1994, and from its inception through 1997 was primarily 
engaged in the development o f process and product technology, with limited commercial production.
The company has successfully developed a unique, proprietary process for applying thin film coatings to 
glass and other products that it believes represents a fundamental technological breakthrough. However, 
since the implementation o f this technology in early 1998 they have not captured a significant share o f  the 
market for this type o f process, and the majority o f their sales have been to two principal customers.
Vitrum's common stock was initially registered with the SEC in May 2000, and is quoted on the 
NASDAQ. Vitrum has been audited by the same Big 4 accounting firm for the preceding five years. 
Vitrum's auditor has always issued standard, unqualified (i.e. clean) audit reports. Following the 
requirements established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2002, Vitrum implemented an online system that 
allows employees to report any potential problems directly to compliance officers and the internal audit 
committee through reporting channels capable of anonymous, two-way communication.
Your role as an outside compliance consultant is to review the internal compliance controls currently in 
place at Vitrum. Specifically, you will review and assess a report o f alleged wrongdoing submitted through 
the Vitrum Reporting System in January 2015. At this time the company was preparing for an audit of 
their annual financial statements for the year ended December 31,2014, which were to be included in their 
Form 10K filed with the SEC. After reviewing the information contained in the report, you are responsible 
for (1) assessing the credibility o f the report and (2) determining the amount of resources to be allocated 
to investigate the alleged wrongdoing.
Before proceeding to the next step, please open the following links in new browser tabs or windows so 
that you may reference them throughout the rest o f the study. The first link contains information regarding 
Vitrum's financial situation for the previous three years. The second link provides an organizational chart 
o f Vitrum's top management and their direct subordinates. Should you accidentally close either link, they 
may be accessed again at the top o f the following pages.
Figure 3.6 -  Background Information
91
Supplemental financial data for the preceding three years (Figure 3.7) and an 
organizational chart was also provided to the participants (Figure 3.8) in order to provide 
context to the organizational structure and financial standing of the company at the time 


























































Net (loss) income ($1,686,043) 60,016 (2.638,289)
Figure 3.7 — Financial Reports for Vitrum Technologies, Inc.
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A reply from the investigator was provided for each message from the employee. 
After round A, the investigator requested additional information to assist in the 
investigation. If more information was received in a second message, the investigator 
thanked the employee for the additional response and also included assurances that their 
identity would remain either confidential or anonymous, dependent upon the treatment. A 
screenshot of the simulated communication, as seen by participants assigned to identified 
treatment number 2 (12), is provided in Figure 3.9. In addition to providing participants 
with a transcript, custom Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) were applied in order to stylize 
the look of the reporting system interface in Qualtrics for a more realistic experience.
Vitrum Reporting System v. 2.3
Employ**
My nam e is Bob Jenkins and  I have b een  a Certified Public Accountant for Vitrum for the  past 
year and  a  half Due to the  com pany’s poor results and  the failure to m eet m arket forecasts 
our CEO Jim Munitz approached m e about a  plan to backdate sa les  invoices a nd  shipping 
docum ents for a large num ber of sa les  m ade during th e  first quarter of 2015 so  that the sales 
could be  recognized in 2014 He said one of Vitrum's freight carriers h a s  ag reed  to backdate 
their bills of lading to correspond with the company s shipping docum ents Jim h a s  now asked 
me to accelerate the recognition of approximately S2 000 000 in revenue for the first quarter of 
2015 This plan would increase  g ross profit and reduce the reported net loss in 2014 by 
approximately S1 000.000 P lease  look into this a s  soon a s  you can b ecause  we need  to 
prepare the financial s tatem ents and I am really concerned about losing my job if I don t 
comply with the CEO s request
1/S/1S at 8:37pm
Investigator
Thank you for submitting your report Is there any additional information that you can provide
to assist u s in the investigation?
1/S/15 at 8:49am
Employ**
Unfortunately I have provided all that I am  willing to disclose at this time
1/12/13 at t:07am
Investigator
l certainly understand your hesitation in providing additional information However we assure  
you that your identity win remain confidential is there  anything e lse  that you would be willing to 
provide to assist us in the  investigation ?
1/12/15 at 8:32am
Mo new messages received, as of 1/23/15 at 4:43pm
Figure 3.9 -  Screenshot of Simulated Communication
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After reading the exchange of communication between employee and 
investigator, participants were asked to rate the credibility of each report, indicate their 
level of confidence in the assessment of credibility, and allocate an appropriate level of 
resources to investigate the issue alleged in the report. Credibility and confidence in the 
assessment of credibility were assessed on a scale from 0 to 100, while investigatory 
resources was measured from $0 to $100,000. To ensure that participants considered an 
adequate trade-off when allocating resources, the original thought was to suggest that the 
$100,000 funds remaining in the monthly budget for investigations were needed for a 
new product-line with excellent profit-generating potential. However, considering that 
the sample of this study consists of those who are charged with investigating reports of 
wrongdoing, the inclusion of a product-line may not generate an appropriate trade-off. 
Therefore, the phrasing of the question, provided in Figure 3.10, was instead altered to a 
time-sensitive need for the implementation of a new compliance program.
Recall, the initial report was received on January 5,2015. When budgeting for 
potential investigations that may result from reports, the board of directors assumed 
that there could be as many as two reports per month and that each investigation would 
cost approximately $50,000, resulting in a total monthly budget of $100,000.
Assume that you still have $100,000 remaining in the board's January 2015 budget and 
that no other reports would be investigated that month. Therefore, any funds that you 
do not use to investigate this report will carry forward to the February 2015 budget, in 
which there is a dire need for another $100,000 to implement a new compliance 
program, which has been mandated by the board of directors and must be implemented 
by February 28,2015.
Based upon the information provided in the report, use the slider below to indicate the 
dollar amount of the January 2015 investigation budget that you would have allocated 
toward investigating the alleged wrongdoing.
Figure 3.10 -  Resource Allocation Measure
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Manipulation Checks
Prior to evaluating the communication between the employee and investigator, 
participants answered a number of questions designed to assess the effectiveness of each 
manipulation and ensure the validity of the experimental design. Each of the five 
manipulation checks were significant, as can be seen in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 — ANOVA Results for Manipulation Checks
Dependent Variable Source Sum of Squares Df
Mean
Square F Sig.
How many messages were 




























How would you rate the 














Did investigator promise 














Did investigator promise 














NOTE: *** p <0.01; ** p <0.05; * p <  0.10
1 This item was measured using a text box.
2 This item was measured using a “Yes” or “No” question.




The total usable sample of 301 respondents consisted of 65% males (Table 3.5), 
with an average age of 49 years, ranging from 20 to 84 years old (Table 3.6). Over 94% 
have attained at least a bachelor’s degree (Table 3.7). Organizational tenure, organization 
type and industry demographics for the sample are provided in Table 3.8, Table 3.9, and 
Table 3.10, respectively.






Table 3.6 — Sample Age
Age (in years) Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
<20 0 0.0 0.0
20-29 14 4.7 4.7
30-39 64 21.3 25.9
40-49 57 18.9 44.9
50-59 85 28.2 73.1
60-69 52 17.3 90.4
>70 12 4.0 94.4
Missing 17 5.6 100.0
Total 301 100.0
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Table 3.7 -  Sample Education Level
Type Frequency Percent CumulativePercent
High School / GED 2 0.7 0.7
Some College 5 1.7 2.3
Associate’s Degree 114 37.9 40.2
Bachelor’s Degree 139 46.2 86.4
Master’s Degree 13 4.3 90.7
Doctoral Degree 18 6.0 96.7
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 10 3.3 100.0
Missing 0 0.0 100.0
Total 301 100.0
Table 3.8 -  Organizational Tenure
Tenure (in years) Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 -1 31 10.3 10.3
2 -3 43 14.3 24.6
4 -5 45 15.0 39.5
6 -7 26 8.6 48.2
8 -9 20 6.6 54.8
10-11 26 8.6 63.5
12-13 14 4.7 68.1
14-15 16 5.3 73.4
16-17 11 3.7 77.1
18-19 9 3.0 80.1
20-21 10 3.3 83.4
22-23 7 2.3 85.7
24-25 7 2.3 88.0
>25 21 7.0 95.0
Missing 15 5.0 100.0
Total 301 100.0
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Table 3.9 -  Type of Organization
T y p e F re q u e n c y P e rc e n t C u m u la tiv e  P e rc e n t
Private, For-Profit 139 46.2 46.2
Private, Not-For-Profit 28 9.3 55.5
Public, For-Profit 11 3.7 59.1
Public, Not-For-Profit 14 4.7 63.8
Local Government 5 1.7 65.4
State Government 15 5.0 70.4
Federal Government 29 9.6 80.1
Self-Employed 1 0.3 80.4
Missing 59 19.6 100.0
Total 301 100.0
Table 3.10 -  Industries Represented
In d u s try F req u e n cy P e rc e n t C u m u la tiv e  P e rc e n t
Accounting 98 32.6 32.6
Banking 5 1.7 34.2
Chemical 1 0.3 34.6
Consulting 36 12.0 46.5
Consumer Products 1 0.3 46.8
Defense 2 0.7 47.5
Education 19 6.3 53.8
Energy 6 2.0 55.8
Entertainment & Leisure 2 0.7 56.5
Financial Services 31 10.3 66.8
Health Care 30 10.0 76.7
Legal 8 2.7 79.4
M anufacturing 11 3.7 83.1
Pharmaceuticals 1 0.3 83.4
Real Estate 1 0.3 83.7
Retail & Wholesale 6 2.0 85.7
Service 11 3.7 89.4
Software 3 1.0 90.4
Sports 2 0.7 91.0
Technology 8 2.7 93.7
T elecommunications 1 0.3 94.0
Transportation 3 1.0 95.0




Descriptive statistics for each of the 10 treatment groups is provided in Table 
3.11, with an average treatment size of 30 participants. Prior to testing the planned 
comparisons for each of the hypothesized relationships, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
was used to test main effects for each of the three primary variables, credibility, and 
confidence in credibility and investigatory resources. The results, provided in Table 3.12, 
indicate that report credibility and confidence in the credibility assessment do vary 
among the treatment groups, but investigatory resources do not.
Table 3.11 -  Descriptive Statistics for Treatment Groups
Experimental Factors Group Credibility Confidence Resources
Anon. Content Messages Size Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
A1 Yes Full 1 27 72.74 15.13 65.37 20.93 62.74 27.77
A2 Yes Full 2 32 78.50 14.19 80.81 15.68 69.09 26.50
A3 Yes Full 3 34 73.79 14.43 76.06 20.33 54.68 30.40
A4 Yes Half 2 33 71.85 17.17 72.70 24.12 58.85 28.47
A5 Yes Half 1 27 64.67 20.67 66.74 25.57 56.78 25.31
11 No Full 1 32 78.31 17.75 80.47 17.17 63.84 26.65
12 No Full 2 30 77.50 14.93 73.17 19.28 62.43 29.73
13 No Full 3 29 80.97 15.82 79.86 16.31 63.34 29.25
14 No Half 2 30 76.87 18.32 76.27 17.08 57.60 28.78
15 No Half 1 27 80.52 14.49 77.11 19.76 57.15 29.54
Totals 301 75.62 16.75 75.06 20.15 60.67 28.20
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Table 3.12 — ANOVA Results for Main Effects
Dependent Variable Source Sum of Squares d f
M ean
Square F Sig.
Between Groups 6,172.53 9 685.84 2.56 .008***
Credibility Within Groups 78,034.53 291 268.16
Total 84,207.06 300
Between Groups 7,550.48 9 838.94 2.14 .027**
Confidence in Credibility Within Groups 114,249.33 291 392.61
Total 121,799.80 300
Between Groups 5,367.09 9 596.34 .74 .668
Investigation Resources Within Groups 233,223.00 291 801.45
Total 238,590.09 300
NOTE: ***p <0.01; ** p <0.05; * p < 0 . 1 0
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was assessed using Levene's (1960) 
test for each of the dependent variables under examination. The results, provided in Table
3.13, indicate that homogeneity of variance can be assumed for both Credibility and 
Investigation Resources, but cannot be assumed for Confidence in Credibility.
Table 3.13 -  Tests of Homogeneity of Variance
Dependent Variable Stattetk: dfl d£2 Sig.
Credibility 1.569 9 291 .124
Confidence in Credibility 2.027 9 291 .036**
Investigation Resources .444 9 291 .911
NOTE: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
In order to assess the hypothesized relationships, six planned comparisons where 
constructed according to the contrast coefficients provided in Table 3.14. The first
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contrast compares anonymous treatments with identified treatments. The second contrast 
compares treatment groups that received additional information in a subsequent message 
(A3 & 13) with those that only received a single message which contained full 
information (Al, A2, II, & 12). Contrast number three compares treatments that provided 
full information (Al, A2, II, & 12) with those that only provided half (A4, A 5,14, & 15). 
The fourth contrast is used to compare the treatments with a single message from the 
whistleblower (Al, A5, II, & 15) to those that received multiple messages (A2, A3, A4,
12,13, & 14). Contrast number five was used to assess the difference between treatments 
which received additional information (A3 & 13) with treatments which received a 
response, but did not provide additional information (A2, A 4 ,12, & 14). The sixth and 
final comparison was conducted in order to compare the credibility of an anonymous 
treatment which exhibited two-way communication with full information (A3) to that of 
identified treatments which were only with provided a single message (II & 15).
Table 3.14 -  Planned Comparisons Contrast Coefficients
Contrast
Al A2 A3 A4
Treatment Group
A5 11 12 13 14 15
1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
2 1 1 -2 0 0 1 1 -2 0 0
3 1 1 0 -1 -1 1 1 0 -1 -1
4 3 -2 -2 -2 3 3 -2 -2 -2 3
5 0 -1 2 -1 0 0 -1 2 -1 0
6 0 0 2 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1
An ANOVA test was then conducted for each contrast to test the hypothesized 
relationships for the study. The results of the planned comparisons are provided in Table
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3.15. The first hypothesis was tested by comparing the assessment of report credibility 
for anonymous treatments against the credibility for identified treatments. Consistent 
with prior theory, the results for this hypothesis support the theorized relationship as the 
anonymous group resulted in a mean credibility rating over 32 percentage points lower 
than the identified treatments.
Table 3.15 -  ANOVA Results for Planned Comparisons
Hypothesis C ontrast M easure Difference Std. E rro r t Statistic d f Sig.
HI 1 Credibility -32.61 9.471 -3.44 291 .001***
H2 1 Confidence -25.20 11.459 -2.20 291 .015**
H3 1 Resources -2.23 16.373 -.14 291 .892
H4a 2 Credibility -2.47 10.206 -.24 291 .809
H4b 2 Resources 22.07 17.644 1.25 291 .212
H5a 3 Credibility 13.15 8.518 1.54 291 .062*
H5b 3 Resources 27.74 14.726 1.88 291 .031**
H6 4 Credibility -30.23 23.445 -1.29 291 .099*
H7 5 Credibility 4.80 10.145 .47 291 .636
H8 6 Credibility -11.24 7.061 -1.59 291 .112
NOTE: *** p < 0 .01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; One-tailed Tests: H I, H2, H3, H4b, H5b, H6
The results of the test for hypothesis two also indicated significant support for the 
theorized relationship that investigator confidence in the assessment of credibility is 
impacted by whether the source of the report is anonymous or identified. This test 
revealed a 25 percentage point reduction in the confidence rating. Despite the violation of 
the assumption of homogeneity of variances for Confidence in Credibility, the results of 
significance testing for hypothesis two showed that a violation of this assumption does 
not impact the tests for Confidence in Credibility as the significance level of .015 was the 
same, regardless of whether equal variances were assumed. Like the previous hypotheses,
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hypothesis three was also assessed with contrast number one. The results of this study 
indicate that there are no differences between the amount allocated to investigate 
anonymous and identified reports. While this finding is contrary to prior theory, rival 
explanations can be formulated to account for this unexpected result. First, since the 
study did not manipulate the alleged wrongdoing under examination, it is possible that all 
investigators felt that the situation was worth investigating for the same amount, 
irrespective of their opinions of credibility. It is also possible that due to the nature of 
anonymous reporting, investigators felt that it would require more, not fewer, resources 
to investigate the alleged wrongdoing. If so, any potential gap in resource allocation that 
may have existed otherwise might have eliminated due to the increase in resources 
necessary to investigate a more challenging report.
The fourth hypothesis theorized that additional information would allow 
investigators to reach the same opinion of the alleged wrongdoing as those who received 
all of the information in a single message. Thus, this hypothesis was assessed in two parts 
in order to test the effect on both assessment of credibility and the allocation of resources. 
First, H4a employed contrast number two to compare treatments with full information in 
a single report to that of treatments which obtained full information across multiple 
messages. Second, H4b tested the same relationship on the allocation of investigatory 
resources. The insignificant differences between means for both tests support the theory 
that two-way communication allows investigators to reach the same conclusion if 
additional information is obtained.
The test for hypothesis five was also conducted in two parts and employed 
contrast number three in order to test the possibility of perceptions of credibility and
106
resource allocation simply being the result of exchanging multiple messages, irrespective 
of the whether any substantive information was gained. This hypothesis was supported as 
the expected result was present for both perceptions of credibility and investigatory 
resource allocation, thus the results are strong enough to reject the rival explanation.
Hypothesis six tests whether investigators negatively assess whistleblower 
credibility if they do not receive additional communication from a whistleblower beyond 
the submission of the initial report. The results of this test reveal that the lack of 
additional communication does negatively influence investigator perceptions of 
whistleblower credibility, which supports the hypothesized relationship. Therefore, it is 
important to encourage whistleblowers to maintain two-way communication with 
investigators in order to reduce the likelihood of an investigator perceiving the reported 
allegations as less credible simply due to a lack of communication.
The seventh hypothesis was assessed with contrast number five, which tests the 
theory that whistleblowers who respond, but indicate that they are either unwilling or 
unable to provide additional information will not experience any reduction in the 
investigator’s perception of credibility. The result of this test does provide evidence that 
investigators’ perception of credibility is not negatively impacted when the whistleblower 
states he or she is unable to provide any additional information.
The eighth and final hypothesis is perhaps the most telling. This test utilized 
contrast six to compare the credibility of anonymous whistleblowers who fully engaged 
in two-way communication, to that of identified whistleblowers who simply submitted 
their initial report. The results reveal that anonymous whistleblowers can be perceived as 
equally credible in the eyes of investigators by engaging in two-way communication
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when compared to identified whistleblowers. This finding further supports the argument 
that two-way communication is critical to the success of effective whistleblowing and 
investigations, and therefore must be included in discussions of the credibility of 
anonymous whistleblowers.
Discussion
The results of this study (summarized in Table 3.16) clearly indicate that two-way 
communication must be considered in future discussions of the credibility of anonymous 
whistleblowers. First, this study has demonstrated that anonymous reports can be 
perceived to have the same level of credibility as identified reports. Second, a number of 
rival explanations have been investigated and found to have no confounding relationship 
with the impact of two-way communication on anonymous whistleblowing. The results 
of this study lead to a number of implications for both practice and future research.
Table 3.16 -  Summary of Results
Hypothesis Hypothesized Relationship Sig. Result
HI Anonymous reports perceived as less credible .001*** Supported
H2 More confidence in assessment for identified reports 015** Supported
H3 Fewer resources allocated to investigate anonymous reports .892 Not Supported
H4a Equal information results in equal credibility assessments .809 Supported
H4b Equal information results in equal allocations o f resources .212 Supported
H5a Less information results in lower credibility .062* Supported
H5b Less information results in lower allocation o f resources .031** Supported
H6 Additional communication increases perceived credibility .099* Supported
H7 Reluctance to share information does not reduce credibility .636 Supported
H8 Two-way communication reduces credibility gap .112 Supported
NOTE: *♦* p < 0.01; * * p <  0.05; * p  <0.10
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Practical Implications
Although research on two-way communication in whistleblowing currently lags 
behind its use in practice, the practical implications of this study are many. First, two- 
way communication provides excellent potential for improving the prospects of 
conducting effective investigations as anonymous reports may now be given proper 
consideration. Second, this study has further strengthened the argument against the use of 
open-door policies and telephone hotlines to report wrongdoing within organizations, as 
anonymous, computer-mediated, two-way communication provides greater anonymity 
protection without negatively impacting credibility. Third, this study has provided 
additional support for the efficacy of the ethics management system design proposed in 
Chapter 2. Lastly, further education should be provided to potential whistleblowers in 
order to encourage them to remain engaged in an active dialogue with investigators so 
that their report receives the maximum amount of consideration possible.
Research Implications
This study also leads to a number of implications for both past and future 
research. First, this study is the first to even suggest the use of two-way communication 
in the whistleblowing process. Therefore, the widely-held belief that anonymous 
whistleblowers aren’t considered credible was simply limited due to the bounds of prior 
theories. By demonstrating the efficacy of two-way communication, this study has shown 
that previous theories failed to fully address the practical needs of both whistleblowers 
and investigators, which may have resulted in neglect for other critical whistleblowing 
research.
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Second, whistleblowing has been widely studied in management, accounting and 
ethics, but little research has been conducted with respect to the technological aspects of 
this phenomenon. Therefore, this study provides an excellent spring board to propel its 
extension into areas of information systems research, such as computer-mediated 
communication, information security, and design science.
Third, since this study was able to reject a number of rival explanations which 
complicate the experimental design, simplified replications of this study can be extended 
to examine a wide variety of aspects which may impact investigators’ perceived 
credibility and resource allocation, such as: (1) the seriousness of the alleged 
wrongdoing, (2) the various components of a whistleblowing report, and (3) whether the 
report is made internally or externally.
Fourth, rather than rely upon simulated communication, experiments with active 
participants serving the role of both whistleblower and investigator can be conducted to 
examine actual dialogue in order to gain a richer picture of such communication.
Lastly, the investigatory resource allocation trade-off decision can be extended to 
a within-subjects experiment which requires investigators to examine and simultaneously 
consider multiple reports of alleged wrongdoing. This would better represent a real-world 
situation for the investigator as he or she would be forced to allocate limited resources to 
investigate potential wrongdoing, which strengthens the generalizability of this research 
stream.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has reviewed existing theories in whistleblowing, as 
well as both inter-personal and computer-mediated communication, to argue for the
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inclusion of two-way communication in whistleblowing research and practice. In doing 
so, this study addressed the limitations of prior theory regarding investigator perceptions 
of anonymous whistleblowers, while also empirically examining theorized relationships 
and rival explanations.
CHAPTER FOUR
PERCEPTIONS OF ANONYMITY PROTECTIONS 
PROVIDED BY ETHICS MANAGEMENT 
REPORTING CHANNELS
Introduction
This chapter assesses the design of an anonymous, two-way ethics management 
reporting system, proposed in Chapter 2, from the perspective of those who are likely to 
observe wrongdoing; that is, the organizational insider. In order to make a comprehensive 
assessment of the design, the proposed system is also compared to other reporting 
channels available to report wrongdoing, such as the use of open door policies and 
telephone hotlines. An online experiment with mixed designs was conducted to test user 
perceptions of each channel, as well as the specific whistleblower-oriented design 
features proposed in this dissertation. Theoretical justification is provided for each of the 
hypotheses under examination, results are discussed and implications for both practice 
and future research are outlined.
Theoretical Background 
The theoretical justification for this study is grounded in prior research on 
anonymity and its role in disclosing wrongdoing. Each of the three reporting channels
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under investigation is discussed in detail, which further informs the justification of the 
technical aspects of the proposed ethics management reporting system outlined in 
Chapter 2.
Anonymity vs. Confidentiality
As discussed in previous chapters, anonymity is only achieved when an 
individual’s identity is not known (Elliston, 1981, 1982). This differs from related terms 
such as confidentiality. In the context of this dissertation, for example, confidentiality 
would involve keeping an identity, which is known to select number of individuals, secret 
from others unauthorized to know. Although employees who wish to disclose 
wrongdoing might have expectations of anonymity, the degree of anonymity a 
whistleblower can achieve is largely dependent upon the capabilities of the chosen 
reporting channel. The limitations of each channel will be discussed in the following 
section.
Limitations of Existing Reporting Channels
Open door policy. The intent of an open door policy is to encourage employees to 
speak to members of management rather than to withhold information by remaining 
silent. However, the extant research in this area shows how such policies might not 
produce the desired results if organizational culture does not match what is said in the 
employee handbook. As one might expect, employees are naturally hesitant to share 
negative news or opinions with management (Detert & Burris, 2007; Detert & Trevino, 
2010; Miceli & Near, 1994; Morrison & Milliken, 2000), especially if it might reflect 
poorly on their standing within the organization (C. Park & Keil, 2009; Rosen & Tesser, 
1970; H. J. Smith & Keil, 2003; Wang et al., 2015).
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The Ethics Resource Center (2010) reports that an overwhelming majority (75%) 
of reports are made directly to either the employee’s immediate supervisor (46%) or to 
higher management (29%). In light of these findings, it should come as no surprise that 
the reported rates of retaliation are high when considering the open door policy, at best, 
can only provide confidentiality. Therefore, anyone disclosing wrongdoing directly to a 
supervisor or member of management via an open door policy simply cannot expect any 
level of anonymity.
Phone hotline. Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran (1999) surveyed a population of 
Fortune 500 industrials and Fortune 500 service corporations, as they were listed in 1994. 
Of the 254 firms who responded, 51 percent reported the adoption of a telephone-based 
hotline or helpline in order to solicit questions and concerns from employees. While the 
use of phone hotlines through much of the 1990s might have been the only viable channel 
for providing some degree of anonymous, two-way communication, telephone-based 
systems have always been inherently vulnerable due to the fact that the caller’s voice is 
likely recognizable, especially to those within the employee’s organization. If the call is 
recorded, there are even more opportunities for others to attempt to identify the 
individual. Even attempts to distort the sound of someone’s voice by using a voice 
synthesizer would not be sufficient to ensure adequate levels of anonymity for the 
technical reasons discussed next.
Today, the use of a phone hotline is even less likely to preserve anonymity due to 
the rise (and even decline) of other technologies. For example, every telephone call is 
routed through a highly regulated telecommunications network. At a minimum, the meta­
data for each call, which includes the time, duration and phone numbers for all parties
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involved, is documented and retained for a period of time by the telephone utility 
responsible for the network. While this information is primarily used to generate business 
records for customer billing purposes, the United States government has also 
demonstrated that such information is well within its reach (Landau, 2013, 2014; van 
Dijck, 2014). Therefore, all callers are at risk of being identified simply by the nature of 
telephone-based systems and data retention.
While the use of a public pay phone might have provided adequate degrees of 
anonymity for the caller at one point, the number of pay phones available in the United 
States has declined substantially in the past fifteen years (U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission, 2014); from a peak of 2.1 million in 1999 to just 152,716 in 2014 (See 
Figure 4.1). In addition, a determined party can now reference other sources, such as 
local surveillance cameras, in an effort to identify who made a particular call from a 
public location at a particular time. Therefore, the only option for obtaining a phone 
number which cannot be traced through business records would be to purchase a prepaid 
mobile phone. However, there are still many ways to determine who purchased the 
phone, especially if it is paid for using any type of electronic payment method.
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Figure 4.1 -  Number of Payphones in the United States 
(U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2014)
Another consideration that threatens, if not completely eliminates, any chance of 
achieving anonymity when reporting via a telephone-based hotline is the sheer volume of 
information generated, collected, transmitted and stored by mobile devices. For example, 
even if an individual were to use a public pay phone multiple states away, his or her 
location might be revealed simply due to traveling to the pay phone with a device that can 
determine a user’s location (e.g., cell phone, vehicle navigation system). While many 
might point to the GPS function in mobile phones as the most obvious threat, a cellular 
mobile device’s location can also be determined via triangulation of broadcast towers. 
Further, as more and more vehicles are equipped with GPS navigation, simply driving a 
car can generate a location log of travels.
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While a single data point might not be enough to identify someone, the correlation 
of multiple data points can reveal a rather complete picture of an individual’s activity 
(Biermann, 2011). To see how this can be achieved, simply review a six month period of 
Malte Spitz’s life via German newspaper Die Zeit Online's “Tell-all telephone” (2011) 
interactive map, which represents the 35,831 data points transmitted by Spitz’s mobile 
phone over that period. Although attempts have been made to anonymize the traffic of 
Voice over IP (VoIP) telephone calls, such as with TORFone (http://torfone.org), the 
latency of such communications results in reduced audio quality, and an anonymous 
caller’s voice might still be recognized. Therefore, without the ability to hide the 
information necessary to protect a caller’s identity, the user is never able to reliably 
achieve anonymity via a telephone hotline.
Although not recommended, someone who is concerned about achieving the 
highest level of anonymity possible when reporting wrongdoing via a phone hotline, he 
or she must ensure that they: 1) purchase a disposable phone with cash that is only used 
for the purposes of reporting; 2) utilize a voice synthesizer or some other method to 
distort his or her voice; 3) remove the battery at all times when it is not in use; and 
4) only make calls from public locations that are not in view of surveillance cameras. 
Performing all of these steps is time-consuming, costly, and involves some technical 
skill, yet still fails to reach the level of reliable anonymity protection necessary to protect 
against retaliation.
Online reporting system. With the advent of the Internet, most, if not all, human 
activity has found a comparable avenue online. This is also true for the reporting of 
wrongdoing. Although some systems existed prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
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Act (2002), most online reporting systems were developed in order to meet the needs of 
the market as all publicly-traded companies in the United States were now legally 
required by Sarbanes-Oxley to adopt an anonymous reporting channel. While many firms 
elected to maintain existing or even adopt new phone hotlines to satisfy this requirement, 
various online reporting systems were added to the portfolio. While online reporting 
systems do not require the user to speak, and therefore removes the possibility of 
recognizing a user by his or her voice, online systems are still vulnerable to similar 
location issues that phone hotlines experience (e.g., IP addresses). In addition, 
transitioning from telephone calls to Internet transmissions introduces a host of new 
threats to the protection of user anonymity. These threats to user anonymity and the 
proposed solutions for online reporting systems are discussed in the following section.
Proposed System Features
In Chapter 2, a number of system features were proposed for inclusion in the 
design of an anonymous ethics management reporting system. This study focuses on the 
features most likely to influence the organizational insider’s (i.e., potential 
whistleblower) adoption of the system and excludes features which are aimed at assisting 
investigators. Therefore, the following system features are under investigation in this 
study: data encryption, Tor web browser, meta-data scrubbing, development method, and 
authentication.
Data encryption. A thorough discussion on the methods and uses of data 
encryption is provided in Chapter 2. Therefore, this section will discuss its role in the 
proposed system in a simplified, more practical sense. The use of data encryption in any 
system is to ensure unintended recipients are unable to decipher the contents of a
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message, which provides secrecy rather than anonymity. In the case of the proposed 
system, end-to-end data encryption is employed from the user to the system server so that 
the identity and location of the user is not revealed. This feature is achieved by a 
combination of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and the Tor Anonymity Network, which 
is discussed in the following section.
Since the exit node removes the last layer of Tor encryption at the end of the Tor 
circuit, the exit node is capable of reading content that was not unencrypted prior to being 
transmitted through the Tor circuit. To protect against this, the data must be encrypted 
once more to remain secure for the entire circuit. Transport Layer Security is currently 
the asymmetric encryption standard for Internet traffic. While technically different from 
its predecessor, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption, both approaches rely on public- 
key encryption. Therefore, each server offering encryption must publish a public key so 
that it is available to interested users. This provision allows anyone wishing to 
communicate with the server to encrypt the contents of the transmission with the public 
key, rendering the contents unreadable unless it is decrypted by the private key of the 
destination server. Furthermore, the use of Tor hidden services ensures that end-to-end 
encryption is achieved as it requires that separate Tor relays be established to a randomly 
selected rendezvous point prior to communicating. Therefore, the inclusion of this 
proposed system feature assists a user by protecting his or her anonymity through the 
secrecy afforded by data encryption.
Tor Browser Bundle. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the use of a browser 
capable of an increased level of privacy and anonymity, such as the Tor Browser Bundle, 
is perhaps the most critical element of anonymous reporting via an online system. The
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Tor Browser Bundle relies upon the Tor Anonymity Network in order to shield the user’s 
digital identity. This identity blocking is accomplished by increasing the number of 
network “hops” between the sender and receiver. The Internet Protocol (IP) address 
associated with the user’s device is obfuscated by enlisting the assistance of three 
randomly selected volunteer nodes on the Tor network, which provides the minimum 
number of hops between the sender and receiver in order for no single node to have 
knowledge of the entire path.
However, while necessary, increasing the number of hops alone is not sufficient. 
Without hiding the location of the nodes which form the Tor circuit, each of the volunteer 
nodes would be able to determine the full path from sender to receiver. Therefore, each 
transmission is encased in three layers of encryption, with each layer intended for one of 
the successive nodes in the circuit. The transmission can then only be decrypted by the 
intended node along the path. Each node then removes their layer of encryption, 
revealing the destination IP address of the next volunteer node, to which it forwards the 
transmission. This allows for the transmission to pass through the relay without a single 
node knowing the entire path due to the fact that the first node only knows the IP address 
of the sender and second node, the second node only knows the first and third, while the 
exit node only knows the second and intended recipient. Although Tor is vulnerable to 
certain attacks discussed in Chapter 2, such as timing analysis, intersection attacks and 
exit node sniffing, it provides the user with much greater anonymity protection than 
would be available with a standard browser.
Meta-data scrubbing. Meta-data is simply data which describe data. As discussed 
earlier, meta-data for a database of phone calls would likely consist of phone numbers,
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time the call was placed, duration of the call and even information about the locations of 
the parties. Just as academia relies on blind peer-review to ensure fair and objective 
evaluation of research, anonymous whistleblowers need to be assured that the chosen 
channel will protect them from the threat of retaliation. Unfortunately, users who have 
clear and justifiable reasons for remaining anonymous might fail to remove meta-data 
from supporting documentation, which might inadvertently reveal their identities. For 
example, Young (2006) explains how the identity of a peer reviewer was unintentionally 
revealed to an author due to the meta-data stored in the Microsoft Word document which 
contained the reviewer’s feedback.
While it would be wise for users to scrub any files of all meta-data prior to 
submission, it would be a disservice to the user not to include additional measures to 
automatically remove information which has the potential to compromise his or her 
identity. Therefore, whistleblowers that provide supporting documentation to support 
their allegations must have protections in place to ensure that such meta-data does not 
jeopardize their anonymity. There are limited tools currently available to incorporate 
directly into an online reporting system and it would be best for a custom solution to be 
developed for this purpose. However, one promising open-source application to consider 
is the Metadata Anonymisation Toolkit (MAT). A description of the program 
(https://mat.boum.org/) and the code repository
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/jvoisin/mat.git) can be reviewed online.
Development method. The method of system development is perhaps the aspect 
of the proposed system design least likely to influence a user’s perception of system 
anonymity. However, that does not mean it should not be or is any less critical in the case
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of a reporting system. Open source development involves making the source code 
publically available for anyone to review, improve and use, free of cost (Cheng, Liu, & 
Tang, 2011; Lemer & Tirole, 2003; Rigby, Cleary, Painchaud, Storey, & German, 2012; 
von Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth, & Wallin, 2012). In many cases, the code for open source 
projects can be found readily available in online repositories such as GitHub.com. This 
system allows for interested parties, even non-programmers, to monitor the project and 
suggest enhancements.
The primary advantage of open-source projects, as opposed to proprietary 
systems, is that the use of open source development provides greater transparency. In 
fact, system vulnerabilities are often identified and resolved more quickly in open source 
development due to the large community of volunteer contributors. Proprietary systems, 
on the other hand, do not afford users the opportunity to look behind the curtain and 
known system vulnerabilities might not be made public, putting users at risk. 
Unfortunately, the naive user might not even be aware of the development method and 
find his or herself utilizing a proprietary system that does not adequately protect user 
anonymity. However, that is not to say all open source projects are always safer than all 
proprietary projects. Instead, proprietary system use simply raises the level of uncertainty 
in terms of system functionality, which is not acceptable for a system tasked with as 
complex a challenge as protecting user anonymity.
Authentication. The proposed design also advocates the use of system-generated 
passphrases for the purposes of user authentication. Authentication is necessary to 
facilitate anonymous, two-way communication since the user must be able to reference 
his or her prior report(s). The use of a system-generated passphrase, as opposed to one
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provided by the user, ensures that the user does not naively enter anything that can 
connected to their identity. For example, if the reporting system is implemented within an 
organization for the purposes of internal reporting, the organization would be able to 
access the user passwords for other systems and match them to the ones used to report 
wrongdoing via the reporting system. Due the challenge of remembering multiple 
passwords, users are unlikely to create unique authentication credentials for each system 
they use, which only increases the threat (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Hayashi & Hong, 2011; 
Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 2004; Zhang, Luo, Akkaladevi, & Ziegelmayer, 2009; Zviran 
& Haga, 1999). By preventing the user from submitting their own and forcing them to 
select a randomly generated passphrase to associate with their report, the user has been 
protected against a potential threat to his or her anonymity.
Research Questions
The prior discussion of the existing literature raises the following research 
questions: (1) How are the existing reporting channels perceived by employees?;
(2) What is the adoption intention for each o f  the existing reporting channels?', (3) Which 
o f the proposed system features influence employees’ perception o f anonymity 
protections?', (4) Would the adoption o f the proposed online reporting system increase 
employees ’ likelihood o f blowing the whistle?
Hypotheses Development 
Formal hypotheses have been developed to test each of these research questions, 
and they will be outlined and discussed in detail in the following section.
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Reporting Channels
Before assessing the specifics of the proposed system design, it is first necessary 
to assess user perceptions of each of the three reporting channels in general. As discussed 
in earlier sections, the best protection an open door policy can provide is confidentiality, 
which is not sufficient for protecting against retaliation. Further, phone hotlines are 
vulnerable to a number of technical issues which might reveal the identity of a caller. 
Therefore, it is expected that users will perceive online reporting systems to provide 
greater anonymity protections than open door policies and phone hotlines. Three specific 
perceptions of anonymity protections are tested for each reporting channel in hypotheses 
HI, H2 and H3. The subdimensions of anonymity under examination consist of 
knowledge of others, system functionality and lack of identification.
H I: The online system will be perceived as more likely to maintain
anonymity with respect to the knowledge of others when compared 
to user perceptions of the:
a) Open Door Policy
b) Phone Hotline
H2: The online system will be perceived as more likely to function as
expected with respect to preserving anonymity of the user when 
compared to the user perceptions of the:
a) Open Door Policy
b) Phone Hotline
H3: The online system will be perceived as more likely to maintain
anonymity with respect to lack of identification of the user when 
compared to the user perceptions of the:
a) Open Door Policy
b) Phone Hotline
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Further, it can be expected that the phone hotline will be perceived as providing 
greater anonymity protections for each of the three subdimensions than can be offered by 
the open door policy. Although not a primary focus of this study, this expected 
relationship is also tested in hypothesis 4 in an effort to thoroughly examine the 
perceptions of each reporting channel.
H4: The phone hotline will be perceived as more likely to maintain
anonymity than the open door policy, with respect to:
a) Knowledge of others
b) Functioning as expected
c) Lack of identification 
System Features
Although the technical capabilities provided by the proposed features are known 
to enhance anonymity protection for the user, system designers must be aware of whether 
users can understand the technical capabilities of the system. Otherwise, naive users are 
unlikely to adopt the reporting channel best suited to protect them. Therefore, hypotheses 
H5 through H9 will test whether the presence of enhanced features increases user 
perceptions of anonymity protections provided by the proposed online reporting system.
H5: The proposed use of the Tor web browser increases user
perceptions of anonymity protections provided by the system.
H6: The proposed use of end-to-end data encryption increases user
perceptions of anonymity protections provided by the system.
H7: The proposed scrubbing of meta-data increases user perceptions of
anonymity protections provided by the system.
H8: The proposed use of open source development increases user
perceptions of anonymity protections provided by the system.
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H9: The proposed use of system-generated passphrases increases user
perceptions of anonymity protections provided by the system.
Methodology
The target sample for this study consisted of full-time employees who were 
currently working for a single employer located within the United States, as they serve as 
the pool of potential whistleblowers who might report misconduct within organizations. 
Study subjects were invited to participate in the experiment after successfully qualifying 
through the use of a demographic survey.
Participants were recruited and compensated via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) crowdsourcing platform (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The reliability 
of data obtained via MTurk workers has been shown to be at least as reliable as other 
online methods (Ayyagari, Grover, & Purvis, 2011) and potentially more reliable than 
traditional subject pools (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; Buhrmester et al.,
2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). MTurk has also been shown to provide samples 
that are as representative of the U.S. population when compared to samples obtained 
from students (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). In terms of diversity, MTurk 
samples are more likely to exhibit representative distributions in term of age, ethnicity, 
and work experience (Behrend et al., 2011). Non-qualifiers were compensated $0.10 in 
exchange for participating in the qualification portion of the study. Those who qualified 
and completed the study were compensated at an average hourly rate of $7.80 (USD) 
based upon the average completion time of 25 minutes.
Two experimental designs, which were conducted simultaneously, were employed 
to investigate the research questions for this study. First, perceptions of three reporting 
channels were tested via a 1 x 3 within-subjects design. After responding to measures of
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employee silence developed by Knoll & van Dick (2013), participants were asked to 
evaluate descriptions of an open-door policy (Table 4.1), phone hotline (Table 4.2), and a 
variation of an online reporting system. Accordingly, the system features for the proposed 
ethics management reporting system were tested using a randomized 25 factorial design 
(Table 4.3). User perceptions of each reporting channel (hypotheses 1-4) were compared 
using paired T-tests, and Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) was 
conducted to assess the impact of each of the proposed features on the perceptions of 
anonymity protection provided by online reporting systems. This mixed-method design 
allowed for comparisons to be made among all three channels, as well as test the specific 
system characteristics in order to determine which features influence user perceptions of 
anonymity with respect to online reporting systems.
Following the evaluation of reporting channels, participants were then asked to 
review and evaluate a randomly assigned scenario adopted from McMahon & Harvey 
(2006). Each of the three scenarios consisted of a moral intensity manipulation (high vs. 
low) in order to test the intent of participants to report the wrongdoing (Table 4.4). 
Respondents evaluated the perceived moral intensity (McMahon & Harvey, 2006) of the 
behavior exhibited in the scenario, as well as provided their perception of the risk of 
reporting the wrongdoing (Lowry et al., 2013). After participants reviewed the scenario, 
whistleblowing intentions were assessed using the scale developed by H. Park & 
Blenkinsopp (2008).
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Table 4.1 — Description of the Open Door Policy
Open Door Policy
Assume that your organization has stated that they are committed to creating a work 
environment where everyone's voice is heard, where issues are promptly raised and 
resolved, and where communication flows across all levels of the company. Openness 
is essential to quickly resolve customer concerns, to recognize business issues as they 
arise, and to address the changing needs of a diverse workforce.
Therefore, also assume your organization has encouraged managers to be available and 
approachable via an “open door policy” in order for employees to feel safe in reporting 
issues directly to management. This method of reporting provides an opportunity for an 
active dialogue to take place between managers and their subordinates.
In accordance with company policy, if an employee so chooses, the identity of any 
employee who shares information with a superior via the open door policy must remain 
confidential.
Table 4.2 -  Description of the Phone Hotline
Phone Hotline
Assume that a telephone hotline may be used to report issues directly to your 
organization’s internal compliance department. The hotline can be accessed 24 hours a 
day and seven days a week by dialing a dedicated phone number, but a compliance 
officer may not be available to answer the call at all times. If the call cannot be 
answered, the employee may leave a voice recording o f the issue and a member of the 
compliance department will review the issue within 24 hours.
An employee using the telephone hotline may elect to withhold his or her name when 
submitting their report. If an employee's identity is provided, the compliance 
department is required to keep it confidential.
An anonymous report can be followed up with during subsequent calls by referencing 
the case number automatically generated by the phone hotline system, which is 
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Table 4.4 -  Scenarios





An employee in charge o f  ordering 
office supplies for your firm discovered 
a box of staples that was not ordered in 
the w eek’s shipment o f supplies and did 
not appear on the invoice. The 
employee decided not to  tell the office 
supply company about the mistake and 
took the staples home.
An employee in charge o f  ordering 
office supplies for your firm discovered 
a laptop computer that was not 
ordered in the w eek 's shipment of 
supplies and did not appear on the 
invoice. The employee decided not to 
tell the office supply company about 










Your firm is considering opening a 
facility in an underdeveloped country 
that appears to be poised for rapid 
growth. Initial contacts with officials in 
the country left no doubt that approval 
o f  your firm’s entry into the market 
would require a contribution to the 
ruling political party. Other firms 
have also attempted to enter the 
market, some of which have made a 
contribution, and some of which have 
cancelled their plans because of their 
refusal to pay a contribution. You 
learn that the CEO o f  your firm has 
approved payment o f  the contribution.
Your firm is considering opening a 
facility in an underdeveloped country 
that appears to be poised for rapid 
growth. Initial contacts with officials in 
the country left no doubt that approval 
o f  your firm ’s entry into the market 
would require a  contribution to the 
ruling political party. Every other firm 
that has attempted to enter the 
market has decided against it, 
because making the contribution was 
a business practice in which they did 
not wish to engage. You learn that the 
CEO o f  your firm has approved 






One o f  your coworkers recently 
decided to buy a new personal 
computer for home use. A state-of-the- 
art computer was purchased at a  very 
affordable price, but the trade-off for 
getting a  low price was that it came 
with a very limited amount o f  pre- 
loaded software. Even though it is 
against company policy, your 
colleagues have mixed opinions 
about using unlicensed software. You 
learn that in order to avoid purchasing 
a personal license for certain software, 
your coworker has decided to install 
software, licensed exclusively to your 
workplace, onto the new home 
computer for personal use.
One o f your coworkers recently 
decided to  buy a  new personal 
computer for home use. A state-of-the- 
art computer was purchased at a veiy 
affordable price, but the trade-off for 
getting a low price was that it came 
with a very limited amount o f  pre- 
loaded software. Your colleagues 
strongly support the company’s 
policy of purchasing of a separate 
license for every computer on which 
a piece of software will be installed. 
However, you learn that in order to 
avoid purchasing a personal license for 
certain software, your coworker has 
decided to install software, licensed 
exclusively to your workplace, onto the 
new home computer for personal use.
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Manipulation Checks
To ensure that the manipulated descriptions of the online reporting system were 
recognized by the participants, a single item was used for each of the five features under 
examination. Based upon the results provided in Table 4.5, the manipulations proved 
effective for each of the five system features.
Table 4.5 -  System Feature Manipulation Checks
ANOVA
Feature Source Sum o f Squares D f Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 282.583 1 282.583 168.080 .000***
Browser Within Groups 677.540 403 1.681
Total 960.123 404
Between Groups 531.306 1 531.306 316.208 .000***
Encryption Within Groups 677.138 403 1.680
Total 1208.444 404
Between Groups 206.431 1 206.431 151.769 .000***
M eta-Data Within Groups 548.147 403 1.360
Total 754.578 404
Between Groups 279.250 1 279.250 199.745 .000***
Development Within Groups 563.407 403 1.398
Total 842.657 404
Between Groups 217.127 1 217.127 119.847 .000***
Passphrase Within Groups 730.117 403 1.812
Total 947.244 404
NOTE: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
Measures
A multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted using IBM® 
SPSS® Amos on three subdimensions of the Confidence in Whistleblowing Reporting
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System measure employed by (Lowry et al., 2013) in order to assess participants’ 
perception of the anonymity provided by each of the three reporting channels. The three 
subdimensions consist of Knowledge of Others, System Functionality and Lack of 
Identification.
As expected, the results of the tests for metric invariance indicated that the models 
for each reporting channel were significantly different. Therefore, the factor structure was 
analyzed separately for each reporting channel. The model fit for the CFA conducted for 
each reporting channel is provided in Table 4.6. However, the measure performed poorly 
in terms of discriminant validity as the average variance extracted (AVE) was lower for 
each construct’s squared correlation estimate. In order to further test the underlying 
theory, the fit for multiple models was compared. The one factor model, as well as 
models with some or all construct correlations fixed to 1, all exhibited worse fit than the 
theoretical 3-factor model proposed by Lowry et al. (2013). According to Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson (2009), this result provides evidence that the original model is 
preferred, despite the limited discriminant validity. The factor structure of the measure 
for each of the three reporting channels is reproduced in Table 4.7.
Table 4.6 -  Model Fit for the Confidence in Reporting Channel Anonymity CFA
Statistic Open Door Policy Phone Hotline Online System
Chi-Square (df) 296.43 (84) *** 291.77(85)*** 233.98(83)***
RMSEA .079 .078 .067
GFI .911 .910 .930
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The total usable sample of 405 respondents consisted of 61% males (Table 4.8), 
with an average age of 34 years, ranging from 19 to 70 years old (Table 4.9). All 
participants were employed with a single employer and over 43% have attained a 
bachelor’s degree (Table 4.10). Organizational tenure, organization type and industry are 
provided in Table 4.11, Table 4.12, and Table 4.13, respectively.





Table 4.9 -  Sample Age
Age (in years) Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
<20 1 0.2 .2
20-29 153 37.8 38.0
30-39 160 39.5 77.5
40-49 57 14.1 91.6
50-59 29 7.2 98.8
60-69 4 1.0 99.8
>70 1 0.2 100.0
Total 405 100.0
134
Table 4.10 -  Sample Education Level
Type Frequency Percent Cum ulative Percent
High School / GED 39 9.6 9.6
Some College 95 23.5 33.1
Associate’s Degree 41 10.1 43.2
Bachelor’s Degree 175 43.2 86.4
Master’s Degree 49 12.1 98.5
Doctoral Degree 3 0.7 99.3
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 3 0.7 100.0
Total 405 100.0
Table 4.11 -  Organizational Tenure
Tenure (in years) Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 - 1 58 14.3 14.3
2 - 3 99 24.4 38.8
4 - 5 97 24.0 62.7
6 - 7 46 11.4 74.1
8 - 9 35 8.6 82.7
10-11 30 7.4 90.1
1 2 -1 3 15 3.7 93.8
1 4 -1 5 9 2.2 96.0
1 6 -1 7 7 1.7 97.8
> 18 9 2.2 100.0
Total 405 100.0
Table 4.12 -  Type of Organization
Type Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Private, For-Profit 292 72.1 72.1
Private, Not-For-Profit 23 5.7 77.8
Public, For-Profit 38 9.4 87.2
Public, Not-For-Profit 19 4.7 91.9
Local Government 11 2.7 94.6
State Government 13 3.2 97.8
Federal Government 8 2.0 99.8
Self-Employed 1 0.2 100.0
Total 405 100.0
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Table 4.13 -  Industry
Industry Frequency Percent Cum ulative Percent
Agriculture 1 0.2 0.2
Accounting 6 1.5 1.7
Advertising 6 1.5 3.2
Automotive 5 1.2 4.4
Banking 10 2.5 6.9
Broadcasting 1 0.2 7.2
Biotechnology 2 0.5 7.7
Chemical 2 0.5 8.1
Consulting 6 1.5 9.6
Consumer Products 3 0.7 10.4
Defense 2 0.5 10.9
Education 42 10.4 21.2
Energy 2 0.5 21.7
Entertainment & Leisure 13 3.2 24.9
Financial Services 33 8.1 33.1
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 16 4.0 37.0
Grocery 2 0.5 37.5
Health Care 51 12.6 50.1
Legal 7 1.7 51.9
Manufacturing 24 5.9 57.8
Pharmaceuticals 4 1.0 58.8
Publishing 2 0.5 59.3
Real Estate 8 2.0 61.2
Retail & Wholesale 40 9.9 71.1
Service 23 5.7 76.8
Technology 46 11.4 88.1
Telecommunications 7 1.7 89.9
Television 2 0.5 90.4
Transportation 16 4.0 94.3
Other 23 5.7 100.0
Total 405 100.0
Hypothesis Tests
Hypotheses 1 through 4 were assessed using paired T-tests of each reporting 
channel. The results are provided in Table 4.14. A Multivariate Analysis of Covariance 
(MANCOVA) was conducted to test hypotheses 5 through 9. The between-effects output 
is reproduced in Table 4.15. A summary of all results can be found in Table 4.16.
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Table 4.14 -  Paired Samples Test of Reporting Channel Perceptions
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences






95% Con. Interval 




H la Online System Knowledge -  Open Door Knowledge 0.965 1.577 0.078 0.811 1.119 12.322 404 .000***
H lb Online System Knowledge -  Phone Hotline Knowledge 0.764 1.698 0.084 0.599 0.930 9.062 404 .017**
H2a Online System Function -  Open Door Function 0.412 1.487 0.074 0.266 0.557 5.571 404 ooo***
H2b Online System Function — Phone Hotline Function 0.176 1.461 0.073 0.033 0.318 2.422 404 .033**
H3a Online System Lack o f  ID -  Open Door Lack o f ID 0.554 1.517 0.075 0.406 0.702 7.349 404 .000***
H3b Online System Lack o f  ID -  Phone Hotline Lack o f  ID 0.589 1.598 0.079 0.433 0.745 7.412 404 .014**
H4a Phone Hotline Knowledge -  Open Door Knowledge 0.955 1.827 0.091 0.776 1.133 10.516 404 .000***
H4b Phone Hotline Function -  Open Door Function 0.259 1.574 0.078 0.105 0.412 3.307 404 .000***
H4c Phone Hotline Lack o f ID — Open Door Lack o f ID 0.696 1.768 0.088 0.524 0.869 7.926 404 .000***
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Table 4.16 -  Summary of Results
Hypothesis Hypothesized Relationship Result
H la Perceived Knowledge o f Others for Online System > Open Door Policy .000***
H lb Perceived Knowledge o f Others for Online System > Phone Hotline .017**
H2a Perceived Channel Functionality for Online System > Open Door Policy .000***
H2b Perceived Channel Functionality for Online System > Phone Hotline .033**
H3a Perceived Lack o f Identification for Online System > Open Door Policy .000***
H3b Perceived Lack o f Identification for Online System > Phone Hotline .014**
H4a Perceived Knowledge o f Others for Phone Hotline > Open Door Policy .000***
H4b Perceived Channel Functionality for Phone Hotline > Open Door Policy .000***
H4c Perceived Lack o f Identification for Phone Hotline > Open Door Policy .000***
H5a Tor Browser increases Perceived Channel Anon.: Knowledge o f Others .017**
H5b Tor Browser increases Perceived Channel Anon.: Channel Functionality .011**
H5c Tor Browser increases Perceived Channel Anon.: Lack o f Identification .003**
H6a Data encryption increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Knowledge of Others .053*
H6b Data encryption increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Channel Functionality N/S
H6c Data encryption increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Lack o f Identification .040**
H7a Meta-data scrubbing increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Knowledge of Others .049**
H7b Meta-data scrubbing increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Channel Functionality .015**
H7c Meta-data scrubbing increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Lack o f Identification .024**
H8a Open source dev. increases Perc. Channel Anon: Knowledge o f Others N/S
H8b Open source dev. increases Perc. Channel Anon: Channel Functionality N/S
H8c Open source dev. increases Perc. Channel Anon: Lack o f Identification N/S
H9a System passphrase increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Knowledge o f Others N/S
H9b System passphrase increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Channel Functionality N/S
H9c System passphrase increases Perc. Channel Anon.: Lack o f Identification N/S
H10 Employee Silence increases Perceived Risk o f Reporting .000***
HI 1 Perceived System Anonymity decreases Perceived Risk o f Reporting .098*
H12 Perceived Risk of Reporting decreases Internal Whistleblowing Intentions .000***
H13 Perceived Risk o f Reporting increases External Whistleblowing Intentions .000***
NOTE: *** p <0.01; **p <0.05; * p  <0.10
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Discussion
Perceptions o f  Reporting Channels
This study has confirmed that users perceive online reporting systems as 
providing more anonymity protection than phone hotlines and open door policies. Despite 
this encouraging result, 75 percent of employees still elect to report to a member of 
management within the organization (Ethics Resource Center, 2010). Therefore, it is 
critical that employees understand that the best defense against retaliation is reporting via 
an online system which can provide the technical anonymity protections necessary to 
protect the identity of the source.
Perceptions of Online Reporting Systems
The results of the test of proposed system features show that certain aspects of 
online reporting systems do influence user perceptions of anonymity protection. 
Specifically, a web browser configured to use Tor, end-to-end data encryption, and the 
automatic removal of document meta-data significantly impacted opinions regarding the 
system’s ability to protect user anonymity. However, the method of development and use 
of a system-generated passphrase did not resonate with the participants. This outcome is 
understandable given that most users are likely unfamiliar with how either feature would 
improve anonymity. Therefore, more education needs to be provided to ensure that users 
understand exactly how each feature can better protect their anonymity.
Implications for Practice
The purpose of this study was to assess the proposed system features from the 
perspective of the common user. The results show that most users are capable of 
recognizing the benefits of familiar features, but struggle to understand the more
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technical aspects of the system. This provides system designers with insight for educating 
users to ensure that they fully understand the capabilities of the system.
Contributions to the Literature
This study has addressed critical gaps in the existing literature. First, the study is 
the first to assess user perceptions of multiple reporting channels simultaneously. Second, 
the study has examined user perceptions of a modem, anonymous, two-way, ethics 
management reporting system. Third, the study has demonstrated that the proposed 
system is perceived to better protect user anonymity.
Suggestions for Future Research
Future studies should consist of a replication of the system features experiment, 
with the addition of detailed explanations of each feature prior to assessing the system. 
This would aid in the goal of increasing adoption by determining effective methods for 
educating users on the technical aspects of the system.
Limitations
Although the study is limited by the sensitive nature o f the subject matter, the use 
of Amazon Mechanical Turk and an anonymous, online instrument provides a safer 
environment for participants to provide honest responses. Further, the study involves the 
assessment of intentions, rather than observed behavior. Unfortunately, the nature of this 
topic is not conducive to such a study.
Conclusion
This study has identified, measured and analyzed the influence of various aspects 
of reporting channels. Specifically, three common reporting channels were compared and
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the primary features of a modem design of an anonymous, two-way ethics management 
system were evaluated. The results have shown that online systems are perceived as 




This dissertation has outlined and evaluated the necessary requirements for an 
anonymous, ethics management reporting system capable of maintaining two-way 
communication. In Chapter 2, design science (Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995; 
Walls, Widmeyer, & El Sawy, 1992, 2004) was employed in order to theorize and justify 
the design of an anonymous reporting system artifact. In doing so, existing reporting 
systems were examined and modem technologies were incorporated into a proposed 
design of an anonymous, two-way ethics management reporting system. Constructs were 
built, models were developed and methods were explained in order to achieve a design 
which satisfies the desired goals of reporting for all actors involved.
Chapter 3 reviewed existing theories in the extant whistleblowing literature and 
relied upon communication research, both inter-personal and computer-mediated, to 
address the limitations of prior theory regarding reduced perceptions of credibility for 
anonymous whistleblowers. In order to assess these perceptions, investigators were 
solicited from a number of professional organizations to participate in an online 
experiment. The experiment tasked subjects with evaluating simulated two-way 
communication between an investigator and an employee attempting to blow the whistle 
on financial wrongdoing. The results of the study provide strong evidence supporting the
148
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efficacy of two-way communication in reducing the credibility gap theorized to exist 
between perceptions of anonymous and identified whistleblowers, which strengthens the 
argument for anonymous reporting.
Lastly, Chapter 4 assessed the proposed design in Chapter 2 from the perspective 
of those who are likely to observe wrongdoing; that is, the organizational insider. In order 
to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the design, the proposed system was also 
compared to other reporting channels available to report wrongdoing, such as the use of 
open door policies and telephone hotlines. Two online experiments were conducted 
simultaneously in order to test user perceptions of anonymity protections provided by 
each channel, as well as the specific whistleblower-oriented design features proposed in 
the design. This chapter provides evidence that online reporting systems are perceived to 
provide significantly higher anonymity protections than phone hotlines and open door 
policies, while select features of the proposed system impact user perceptions of 
anonymity.
Implications for Practice 
This research has a number of practical implications. Chapter 2 addressed the 
critical need for the design of an anonymous ethics management system and includes the 
addition of two-way communication capabilities between an anonymous whistleblower 
and investigator. As was shown in Chapter 3, this technological advancement has the 
potential to bridge the perceived credibility gap between anonymous and identified 
whistleblower reports. Addressing this issue has tremendous implications for practice in 
that unethical or illegal behavior reported by anonymous sources via two-way 
communication should receive greater consideration by investigators.
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Further, the ability to protect anonymity at the system level is the best method for 
dramatically reducing the incidence of whistleblower retaliation. Therefore, the 
development of a system that is perceived by potential whistleblowers as providing the 
highest degree of anonymity protection, as was shown in Chapter 4, provides 
organizations with a more effective method of soliciting information regarding 
wrongdoing within the organization. Any subsequent increase in reporting as a result of 
implementing a system consistent with the proposed design will provide greater insight 
into potential problems within the organization, which allows for the appropriate 
corrective action to be implemented earlier.
Lastly, Chapter 4 assessed a select number of the proposed system features from 
the perspective of the common user. The results of this study have shown that most users 
are capable of recognizing the benefits of familiar features, but struggle to understand the 
more technical aspects of the system. This provides system designers with insight for 
educating users to ensure that they folly understand the capabilities of the system.
Academic Contributions
In terms of academic contributions, this research has addressed critical issues with 
prior theory and sets the stage for an extensive research stream in information systems. 
The addition of two-way communication capabilities between an anonymous 
whistleblower and investigator had yet to be suggested as a possibility in the extant 
whistleblowing literature. By suggesting this capability in Chapters 1 and 2, and testing it 
in Chapter 3, this research has shown that the long-held belief that anonymous 
whistleblowers are always perceived as less credible simply due to being anonymous is 
only limited to one-way communication. As was shown, investigators are just as capable
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of perceiving an anonymous source to be equally as credible as an identified source when 
information is exchanged via two-way communication. Lastly, Chapter 4 is the first study 
to assess user perceptions of multiple reporting channels simultaneously, including user 
perceptions of a modem, anonymous, two-way, ethics management reporting system.
This study has demonstrated that the proposed system is perceived as providing 
significantly better protection in terms of user anonymity.
Future Research
This study also leads to a number of future research directions. First, the proposed 
system design provides the first conceptualization of such a system in the academic 
literature. Although whistleblowing has been widely studied in disciplines such as 
management, accounting and ethics, little research has been conducted with respect to the 
technological aspects of this phenomenon. Therefore, this study provides an excellent 
foundation to propel whistleblowing research into areas of information systems research, 
such as computer-mediated communication, information security, and design science.
Second, since the study conducted in Chapter 3 was able to reject a number of 
rival explanations, simplified replications of this study can be extended to examine a 
wide variety of aspects which may impact investigators’ perceived credibility and 
resource allocation, such as: (1) the seriousness of the alleged wrongdoing, (2) the 
various components of a whistleblowing report, and (3) whether the report is made 
internally or externally. Further, rather than rely upon simulated communication, 
experiments with active participants serving the role of both whistleblower and 
investigator can be conducted to examine actual dialogue in order to gain a richer picture 
of such communication. The investigatory resource allocation trade-off decision can also
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be extended to a within-subjects experiment which requires investigators to examine and 
simultaneously consider multiple reports of alleged wrongdoing. This would better 
represent a real-world situation for the investigator as he or she would be forced to 
allocate limited resources to investigate potential wrongdoing, which strengthens the 
generalizability of this research stream.
Third, future studies could consist of a replication of the system features 
experiment conducted in Chapter 4, with the addition of manipulated explanations of 
each feature prior to assessing the system. This would aid in the goal of increasing 
adoption by determining effective methods for educating users on the technical aspects of 
the system.
Lastly, this entire research stream can be directed towards avenues in information 
security by advocating the use of ethics management reporting systems to assist in the 
identification of vulnerabilities in an organization’s policies, procedures and systems. In 
doing so, it can be argued that organizational insiders might be more likely to engage in 
protection-motivation behaviors and report suspicious activity if an anonymous channel 
designated to receive reports of such threats is available.
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